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In his classic discourse on how to obtain, retain and use
political power, Machiavelli advised the ruler that it is better to
be feared than loved, "for love is held by a chain of obligations
which, men being selfish, is broken whenever it serves their purpose;
but fear is maintained by a dread of punishment which never fails.
This radical doctrine constitutes a definite break with classical
ideas about the nature of man, government, and society. Power, sheer
naked power, expressed in fear, not benevolence, hard work, appeals to
logic, or even wealth, was for Machiavelli -- or at least traditional
interpretations of Machiavelli -- the final arbiter of human behavior.
Ideas advanced by Machiavelli in The Prince have had a profound
effect on the thoughts and actions of those seeking absolute power. In
the twentieth-century, this circle of adherents to Machiavellian princi¬
ples has been widely extended by those in revolt against the older
forms of the state. "In his student days Mussolini selected it as the
subject of a thesis for his doctorate. It was Hitler's bedside reading,
and we need not be taken aback when in his excellent introduction to
The Prince and The Discourses Max Lerner tells us that Lenin and Stalin




as well have gone to school to Machiavelli.”^ The ultimate manifesta¬
tion of this concentration on the manipulation of man through absolute
power has been the establishment of the modern "total" state or what is
commonly known as totalitarianism.
Purpose
Soviet Russia since 1917 has developed into one of the greatest
totalitarian states of the modern era. This study is designed to
illuminate patterns of change and stability in the Soviet dictatorship
through a concentration on its utilization of terror as a mechanism
of power and control.
The Nature of Totalitarianism
The crux of any attempt to probe the nature of modern totalita¬
rianism is the perplexing issue of its uniqueness. For, according to
Friedrich and Brzezinski, "one flatters it when one calls a dictatorship
of this kind a tyranny or despotism. The autocratic regimes of the
past were not nearly as ghastly as the dictatorships of our time.""^
Certainly, autocratic systems in the past displayed many of the
features developed and accentuated by modern totalitarianism. "Diocle¬
tian's tyranny or the shogunate in Japan, for instance, stressed to a
high degree the acquiescence of the population in centralized control.
^Christian Gauss, Introduction to Machiavelli, Ibid., p. 8.
^Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian
Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York, 1962), p. 3.
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Both systems also institutionalized an atmosphere of fear through a
system of secret police informers not unlike the totalitarian societies
of the twentieth-century."^ Similarly, nineteenth and twentieth-century
benevolent reformers sometimes sanctified their liberal policies with
a readiness to use violent measures to see that they are adequately
carried out.
One could easily run the gamut in pointing up other cases involving
features similar to some of the characteristics of totalitarianism. In
all these systems, the truly distinguishing feature is that the ruler
is not responsible to anyone else for what he does; he is the autos who
himself wields power, that is to say, he makes the decisions and reaps
the fruits of them. The important point to note is that while a great
many past autocracies have had one or more features of modern totali¬
tarianism, none have possessed all of the basic criteria which have
combined to form what is known today as the total state.
Unlike any past or present dictatorships, totalitarianism involves
permanent revolution. The concept of permanent revolution suggests that
totalitarian movements wielding power do not aim to freeze society in
the status-quo, but on the contrary institutionalize a revolution which
3
mounts in scope and intensity, as the regime stabilizes its power.
^Z. K. Brzezinski, "Totalitarianism and Rationality," American
Political Science Review, L (September, 1956), 751,
2Friedrich and Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 3-4.
\bid. . p. 252.
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This revolution is based on the ethical consideration that what is, is
not what ought to be and cannot be improved upon or propped up in its
present form. As a result, the totalitarian movement seeks to pulverize
all existing political order so that it can subsequently be revolutionized
economically, socially and culturally.
In the words of Sigmund Neumann:
Modern dictatorship is ready to make use of
elements of unrest that will feed the fire of
permanent revolution, and relinquish them
after they have outlived their usefulness.
The total state of today above all implies
continuous dynamics which cannot be stopped
permanently. The first aim of totalitarian¬
ism is to perpetuate and to institutionalize
revolution.^
Motivated by the goals of its ideology, the totalitarian movement
does not satisfy itself with the seizure of supreme governing power, but
perennially seeks to extend this power throughout the length and breadth
of society. Thus change becomes the order of the day. This change,
which is not meant to stop with the fulfillment of the first Five-Year
Plan, is intended to be the task of generations.^ The process of building
communism is not finished with the mere physical liquidation of the capi¬
talist. The revolution continues, as Soviet leaders emphasize, with
O
each accomplished task giving birth to another.
Sigmund Neumann, Permanent Revolution (New York, 1942), p. viii.
^Friedrich and Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 130.
^Ibid.
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This futuristic, forward-orientation of totalitarianism is in
striking contrast to the aims of traditional dictatorships whose ob¬
jective, for the most part, has been the prevention of history from
keeping up with time -- the maintenance of the status-quo. When they
fail to preserve the existing order by allowing fundamental encroach¬
ments on political power to set in, they often lose much of their dic¬
tatorial character.
Totalitarianism also differs from traditional dictatorship in
that it attempts to completely destroy all restraints on the acquisi¬
tion and utilization of absolute political power. In dictatorships
of the past, at least three overriding restraints on the obtuse use
of power has existed. These restraints are:
Direct restraints, expressed through pacta conventa
such as the English Magna Carta or Polish Nihil novi...
the Bill of Rights, constitutional guarantees, a rule
of law, or even the broad consensus of tradition which
rules out certain types of conduct, such as violence;
indirect restraints which stem from the pluralistic
character of all large-scale societies and which neces¬
sitate adjustment and compromise as the basis for
political power--the churches, the economic interests,
professional, cultural or regional pressure groups,
which all impede the exercise of unrestrained power;
and natural restraints such as national character and
tradition, climate and geographical consideration, kin¬
ship structure and particularly the primary social unit
the family.1
^Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, "The Patterns of Autocracy," in Cyril
E. Black (ed.). The Transformation of Russian Society (Cambridge, 1960),
p. 102.
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It is only totalitarianism of our age which rejects all three
kinds of restraints.^ Only totalitarian governments, upon taking power,
immediately attempt to banish direct and indirect restraints on power
by pulverizing the existing society and totally extending its influence
throughout the state. The ultimate result of this procedure has been
the tendency for totalitarian regimes to destroy associations in an
attempt to remake society, and subsequently man himself according to
certain ideal conceptions.
Elaborating on this idea, Bertram D. Wolfe states:
The essence of the total state is that it aspires
to be total. It asserts that the state is identi¬
cal with society and coextensive with it, that all
the purposes of the state are identical with the
purposes of society, and that society can have no
purposes that are not state purposes. Therefore
it denies autonomy to the individual, his private
purpose, his judgment, his conscience, his moral
responsibility.^
After completely dominating one of the pivotal attributes of man--
his creative energies--the totalitarian state proceeds to destroy those
institutions in which he functions. In this context, William Z. Foster,
in Towards Soviet America, explains that under the dictatorship, "all
the capitalist parties--Republican, Democrat, Progressive, Socialist,
etc.--will be liquidated, the Communist party functioning alone as the
party of the toiling masses. Likewise will be dissolved chambers of
Brzezinski, "Totalitarianism and Rationality," op. cit., p. 753.
p. 238,
Bertram D. Wolfe, Six Keys To The Soviet System (Boston, 1956),
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commerce, employers associations, rotary clubs, American Legion, Y.M.C.A,,
Masons, Odd Fellows, Elks, Knights of Colximbus, etc."^ Whatever non-state
organizations exist when the totalitarian state dictatorship is formed
must either be incorporated into the network of state institutions or
be viewed as an anti-state organization and subsequently liquidated.
The complete elimination of direct and indirect (and as nearly as
possible, natural) restraints on power by totalitarian states has crucial
significance for this study. Without destroying these elements which
tend to curb the acquisition of total power, the totalitarian state can
never achieve the isolation of the individual and the mass monolithic
homogeneity that are its aims. Having removed these stumbling blocks
to absolute power the totalitarian state seeks to penetrate every aspect
of life, assxome control of every interest, undertake systematic organi¬
zation of every activity and convert every individual interest and acti¬
vity into state activity. It is this attempt to penetrate all organiza¬
tions and direct all activities, not excluding love and art and music and
dreams, that forces the totalitarian state to become a universal police
state.2
...Some of the 'unredeemable social misfits' have to be
removed, and it is difficult for the regime to single
out for extinction particular social groups without
^William Z. Foster, Toward Soviet Amierica, cited in Wolfe, op. cit.,
pp. 238-239.
^Brzezinski, "Totalitarianism A.nd Rationalityop. cit. . p. 753.
%olfe, op. cit. , p. 239.
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soon involving itself in large scale terror. Society
is composed, after all, of largely overlapping associa¬
tions and loyalties. Terror thus becomes an inevitable
consequence as well as instrument of the revolutionary
program. ^
The total character of the totalitarian state, involving terror,
alteration and indoctrination, sets it firmly apart from all other types
of governmental systems. In this respect, totalitarianism is truly a
novel form of government.
Generally, there are six features which tend to be a part of all
totalitarian regimes, they are: (1) an official ideology; (2) a single
mass party; (3) a system of terroristic police control; (4) monopoly
of all means of effective mass communication by the party and its sub¬
servient cadres; (5) a similar monopoly (in the same hands) of all means
of effective armed combat; (6) a central control and direction of the
entire economy through the bureaucratic co-ordination of its formerly
independent cooperate entities.^
In terms of a working definition of totalitarianism, it may be seen
as a system where technologically advanced instruments of power wielded
without restraint by centralized leadership of an elite movement, for the
purpose of effecting total social revolution, including the conditioning
of men on the basis of certain arbitrary ideological assumptions pro¬
claimed by the leadership in an atmosphere of coerced unanimity of the
^rzezinski, "Totalitarianism and Rationality," op. cit., pp. 753-
754.




Essential Features of Totalitarian Terror
The Nature of Totalitarian Terror.--As we have seen in the previous
discussion, one of the pivotal features of modern dictatorship is its
total quality based on fear which permeates every nook and cranny of
society. However, one distinction, indeed, must be drawn, if we are
not to fall into a moral confusion.
Every government makes use of fear. That is what we mean when we
speak of deterring. "From the Magistrate who fines a motorist ignoring
a signal to the judge who assumes the black cap in passing sentence upon
murder, punishment is used for this purpose, and talk of curative or
reformatory measures has not made an end of the practice.But we
reserve the word terror for something less discriminating than this
ordinary penal jurisdiction. We talk of terror when the blow is struck
at whole groups or classes without regard to the culpability of the individuals
and apply the word to the organization of fear, by governments, or by
parties contending together for supremacy, as a means of eliminating
opposition compelling cooperation.^
^Brzezinski, "Totalitarianism and Rationality," op. cit., p. 754.
2
Sir John Maynard, Russia In Flux (New York, 1948), p. 280.
^Ibid.
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"There are force and terror in every revolution, especially in
its initial stages; but what differentiates the twentieth century pat¬
tern of world revolution from all earlier and more primitive models is
the development of organized terror and its systematization into a
strategy of frightfulness.
Guided by its futuristic ideology, the totalitarian movement goes
ahead confident in the blissful thought that it is marching in step with
history. The constant rejection of the past for the sake of the grandiose
schemes of social reconstruction and human remolding thus provides the
basis for the extension of totalitarian power to all segments of society.
This determination to achieve rapid total change provides a basis for
the use of terror. "Change always entails opposition; in a free society
total change cannot occur, because it would bring forward massive resis¬
tance from a variety of groups and interests. In a totalitarian society
opposition is prevented from developing by the organization of total terror
which engulfs everyone."^ Thus a policy normally utilized by more tra¬
ditional dictatorships as a vehicle for seizing power and cast aside
when its usefulness for this purpose is exhausted, becomes under totali¬
tarianism, a hard and fast weapon of perennial coercion and alteration.
The survival of the totalitarian state depends to a great extent
on institutionalized terror. Repressive measures of the totalitarian
regimes, which first aims at eliminating their open enemies, are gradually
^Neumann, op. cit.. p. 199.
^Friedrich and Brzezinski, op. cit.. p. 131.
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extended in snoball fashion, to other sections of society,^ Totali¬
tarian terror grows in leaps and bounds. It not only becomes a prophy¬
laxis of the regime, aimed at anticipating political resistance--it
becomes a fundamental method of achieving the total goals of the regime
and of maintaining the permanent revolution without which the regime
would lose its total character, and probably also its power.^ This
position of terror in the totalitarian system epitomizes the new type of
full-grown revolution and is the pivotal key to the understanding of
modern dictatorial governments.
Arbitrariness.--
A fundamental difference between modern dictatorships
and all other tyrannies of the past is that terror
is no longer used as a means to exterminate and
frighten opponents, but as an instrument to rate
masses of people who are perfectly obedient. Terror
as we know it today strikes without any provocation,
its victims are innocent even from the point of
view of the prosecutor.^
The ultimate purpose of terror is control. This emphasis on the
complete control of individuals and institutions in the totalitarian state
through violent means has lent to the terror an aura of capriciousness
which has never ceased to mystify and frighten those upon whom it is
launched. "'If the rules of punishment are clear, people are not afraid
\hid.
hhid,
%annah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, 1951),
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because they can find security in their own conscience. But when no one
knows who is to suffer next, or why one victim will be chosen rather
than another, terror spreads]'^
Terror acting in its most pervasive form in Soviet Russia kept
the whole population guessing who the next victim would be. Even the
most stalwart supporters of the regime were not immune to the brutal
methods of the secret police, who pounced anywhere, at any time. The
stature, the wealth, the past of the family gave no clue to its special
fate. "When the squad drove up at midnight, their motors roaring, and
marched up the stairs of apartment houses crunching their heavy boots
for all to hear, no one knew at which landing they would knock. Those
who heard the fearful footsteps pass on by, knew in their hearts that it
might well have been their own door. Each time it happened they shrunk
O
a little further inside themselves." Such is the nature of the arbi¬
trary element in totalitarian terror.
Secrecy.--One of the basic stimuli of the arbitrary use of totali¬
tarian terror is the secrecy which permeates the whole environment.
Straightforward announcement of who is being victimized and why--dimi-
nishes the effect of arbitrariness. But when citizens are arrested
and whisked off to concentration camps without being given an explanation,
and where there is no effective channel of communication between the
^Flora Lewis, "The Anatomy of Terror," New York Times Magazine, •
November 18, 1956, p. 14.
^Ibid.
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ruler and the ruled by which appeals to law and common sense can be
made, arbitrariness flourishes. This seems to have been the case during
the era of the Great Purge in the U.S.S.R. No one knew how many people
had been arrested nor how many more would be. No one knew how great was
the danger nor how long it would last. No one knew, for some months at
least, what had happened to those who were snatched. Thus secrecy
heightened the effect of arbitrariness.^
Secrecy does not necessarily mean silence, for when there is no
2actual information speculation and rumor rush in to fill the void.
Commenting on this aspect of secrecy during periods of widespread terror
in totalitarian societies, Flora Lewis states:
Bland official denial that anything is amiss when the
facts stand out so starkly, has the main purpose of
multiplying debilitating rumors. Who can tell what
to believe when a thousand stories are rxmning
through the streets and the only public statement
is an obvious lie.^
Of such uncertainty is panic made, and panic saps courage and
destroys moral resolution.
Ruthlessness.--Ruthlessness is another major element of totali¬
tarian terror. Terror and moral scruples cannot mix. One or the other
^Ibid.
2
There is reason to believe that during the Great Purge a calculated
use was made of rumor to increase the general effectiveness of police
action. When people disappeared a mystery was made of how and where and
why, but the fact of the disappearance was immediately widespread. For
further information about this aspect of terror see Barrington Moore,
Terror and Progress. USSR (Cambridge, 1954), pp. 166-167.
^Ibid.
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must be rejected, because a diluted dose of terror, like a weak dose of
poison, only serves to irritate the victim. "Modern dictatorships have
reintroduced the time-honored principle that fear is one of the ke3niotes
to human behavior. It is fear, according to Hobbes, that forces the
human being into the social contract. It makes him accept the coercion
of the all-powerful absolute state.
When the authority in whose name coercive power operates will only
tolerate it within certain limits, inner restraints exist which drasti¬
cally reduce the effectiveness of terror, thus reducing its ruthless
nature. But, the absence of this moral restraint on absolute coercion,
as often found in totalitarian states, enables the terror to flaunt
ethical principles of human dignity and operate in the most brutal manner.
According to Hannah Arendt,
Terror becomes total when it becomes independent of all
opposition, it rules supremely when nobody any longer
stands in its way.... Terror as the execution of a law
of a movement whose ultimate goal is not the welfare
of man but the fabrication of mankind eliminates indi¬
viduals for the sake of the specie^ sacrifices the
'part' for the sake of the 'whole'.^
When those who have the power to order arbitrary punishment consider
it a necessary evil, their avenging hand must quiver constantly as it tests
3
the balance between moral wrong and political determination. When those
^Neumann, op. cit., p. 199.
2
Hannah Arendt, op. cit., p. 465.
^Lewis, op. cit., p, 14.
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who have the power consider only necessity, and are unconcerned with
good or evil, the hand is firm and implacable. The difference communi¬
cates itself quickly to the victims.
Theoretical Basis of Soviet Terror
Terror has developed on a gigantic scale in the U.S.S.R. This
fact has prompted one Western scholar to observe that, "The Soviet
state has existed longer, is more total, the power of Stalin and his
successors more absolute, the purges bloodier, and more sweeping and
more continuous, the concentration camps larger and more 'useful' than
anything Mussolini dreamed or Hitler introduced."’^ Although the actual
validity of this statement is open to question, events in the U.S.S.R.,
over the past four decades, reveal that Soviet leaders have often applied
the methods of terror in a very ruthless manner. To give an air of
legitimacy to the massive use of terror, Soviet leaders have tended to
create their own theoretical justifications based on their interpretation
of the Marxian theory of the state as an instrtiment of class domination.
In his work Marx, Engels .Marxism. Lenin interprets Marx's theory of state
oppression in the following manner:
...forward development toward Communism, proceeds through
the dictatorship of the proletariat, and cannot do other¬
wise, for the resistance of the capitalist exploiters
cannot be broken by any one else, or in any other way.
With an immence expansion of democracy, which for the
first time becomes democracy for the poor, democracy
for the people and not democracy for the money bags.
Wolfe, op. cit., p. 249.
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the dictatorship of the proletariat imposes restrictions
on the freedom of the oppressors, the exploiters, the
capitalist. We must suppress them in order to free hu¬
manity from wage slavery, this resistance must be
crushed by force.^
Relying upon this interpretation of Marxist philosophy, Lenin and
the early Bolsheviks thus accepted violence as implicit in the class
struggle between the bourgeoise and proletariat, and a necessary tool
to insure the total victory of the latter over the former. As Lenin
said in defending the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, "violence
when it is committed by the toiling and exploited masses is the kind of
violence of which we approve."2 This outlook on violence provided
Lenin with a justification for its use when it was done in the name of
the dictatorship of the proletariat and aimed at stamping out the capi¬
talist exploiters and establishing a true equalitarian democracy.
After the revolution of 1917 and the ascendancy of the Bolshevik
party as the vanguard of the revolution, Lenin's theory on the use of
terror was expanded to include all persons, groups, or institutions en¬
gaged in activity designed to revert the government to its pre-revolu¬
tionary status. In rationalizing this new twist of Marxian precepts,
Lenin wrote:
The abolition of classes...is the work of long, diffi¬
cult, stubborn class struggle, which even after the
overthrow of the power of capital, after the
destruction of the bourgeoise state, after the
P.
^V. I. Lenin, Marx, Engels,Marxism (Moscow,







erection of the dictatorship of the proletariat, does
not disappear....but merely changes its forms and be¬
comes still more violent in many respects.’^
Capitalism was not yet destroyed in Russia, according to Lenin's
argument. Individuals from the bourgeoise still enjoyed advantages of
wealth, education and experience, in addition to the moral and material
2
support they might still be receiving abroad. Other elements in society
expressed radical bourgeoise sentiments and constituted a potential
threat to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Under such conditions,
elimination of state terror apparatus would leave the dictatorship sus¬
ceptible to punitive reprisals from all these petty bourgeoise elements.
Thus, the dictatorship of the proletariat was considered necessary by
Lenin in order to carry out the liquidation of the former privileged
classes and counter-revolutionary enemies of the state. After these
classes had been liquidated, there would be no need for the state.
This expanded doctrine of the proletariat dictatorship
has furnished the vehicle by which Communists are able
to rationalize whatever violent means the Soviet state
uses against individuals.... This doctrinal basis
served for years after the October Revolution to justify
the arrest, transportation, and execution of huge
numbers of former merchants, intellectuals, and peasants
on the ground that all this was necessary as a part of
the process of liquidation of the classes left over from
capitalistic society.^
^Cited in Alfred G. Meyer, Leninism (Cambridge, 1957), p. 201.
^Ibid.
^Calvin B. Hoover, Dictators and Democracies (New York, 1938),
p. 26.
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Stalin's theoretical defense of terror covered primarily the same
ground as that of Lenin's. However, he expanded this doctrine even
further by adding still another convenient formula, that of capitalist
encirclement. This formula proved to be elastic enough to justify his
purge of the party, insinuating the presence of enemies inside the
party as well as outside. Warning against this threat to the dictator¬
ship, Stalin states:
It should be remembered and never forgotten that as
long as capitalist encirclement exists there will be
wreckers, diversionists, spies, terrorist, sent be¬
hind the frontiers of the Soviet Union by the intel¬
ligence services of foreign states....
It should be explained that the Trotskites, who re¬
present the active elements in the diversionist,
wrecking and espionage work of the foreign intelli¬
gence services—have already long ceased to serve
any idea compatible with the interests of the
working class, that they have turned into a gang
of wreckers, diversionist, spies, assassins, with¬
out principles and ideas, working for the foreign
intelligence services.
It should be explained that in the struggle against
contemporary Trotskyism, not the old methods, the
methods of discussion, must be used, but new methods,
methods for smashing and uprooting it.l
In their desperate search for a convenient base from which to
solidify control of the state, both Lenin and Stalin found it necessary
i
to manipulate Marxian theory to protrude it in a different direction.
Originally Marxist ideology provided for terror only as a means of
brushing away the old order. Under Lenin this ideal was expanded to
Cited in Fainsod, op. cit., pp. 356-357.
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perpetuate the terror until all of the enemies of the state were annihilated.
Adopting the same principles but also adding his footnote to the body
of knowledge, the terror under Stalin was extended to include the peren¬
nial defense of Russia against raging capitalist encirclement. This
policy eventually included elimination of all opposition to the mono¬
lithic control of the party and dictator. Behind these rationalizations
was the crystallization of a system of government in which terror had
become the essential ingredient.^
CHAPTER II
LENINIST POLITICS OF TERROR
Historic Tradition of Terror In Russian Society
Czarist Legacy of Absolutism and Terror.--Terror in the U.S.S.R,
did not originate with the Bolshevik revolutionaries, but had its roots
deep in Russian history. While western Europe had for centuries been
the scene of struggle between kings and cities against feudal lords, and
then of the third estate against the absolute power of the king, in
Russia those centuries saw only ever-greater subjugation of the people.
In suppressing the will of the people to the will of the sovereign,
Russian Czars bequeathed to Lenin and the Socialist revolutionaries a
morbid legacy of arbitrary death and human deprivation.
The first great Russian Czar to employ the methods of terror on a
grand scale was Ivan IV (1530-1584). In his resorts to violence, Ivan
IV, nicknamed Grozny (usually translated as The Terrible), went far
beyond the calculated brutality of his predecessors. According to one
source, "his victims were given no trial. In one day as many as 1500
persons were butchered in wholesale slaughter. Throughout the realm the
numbers of slain mounted into the thousands."^
Combining the soul of a wild beast with the avowed con¬
science of a man of God, he followed the practice of
having masses said for the souls of those whom he had
killed with his own hands (among them, his son Ivan)
^Dorsey D. Jones, Russia: A Concise History (Harrisburg, 1958), p. 29.
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and those whose executions he had ordered. His victims
came from many classes, though his chief suspicions were
centered on the aristocratic families. His rule was to
strike down any, high or low, who opposed him or whom
he suspected of disloyalty.^
The reign of Peter the Great (1692-1725), perhaps the most prominent
of all the Russian Czars, was also characterized by periodic outbursts of
2
terror. In suppressing the Streltsy Revolt, Peter dismissed many men from
O
their post in the army and executed thousands. It is rumored that he
personally decapitated some of them with his axe.^ For five months corpses
were left on the scaffolds where they were hanged or exposed on public
squares so that they might serve as examples of the fate that would come
to persons who opposed him.^
Nicholas I (1796-1855) also made a considerable contribution to the
legacy of Czarist terror. On December 26, 1825, the day Nicholas was to
ascend the throne, a regiment of the Guards refused to swear allegiance
to him, proclaimed Constantine, his brother, the lawful Emperor, and
demanded a constitution for Russia. The emissars sent by Nicholas to
negotiate with the rebel leaders were fired upon; in the meantime the
populace began to join the insurgents. Before the revolt could gain
momentum, Nicholas ordered a battery to open fire on the rebels,^
^Sidney Harcave, Russia A History (Chicago, 1959), p. 47.
2
A move by an organization of soldiers in the Russian Army to over¬
throw Peter in favor of Sophia, past regent of the crown.
3





The Decembrist were put to flight, leaving many dead and wounded on the
streets. Five of their leaders were hanged, thirty-one were sentenced
to long terms of hard labor, others were exiled to Siberia.^
Many other examples of Czarist terror could be given, extending
up to "Blood Sunday"^ under Nicholas II, the last of the Russian Czars.
The central point to note in this discussion is the fact that the
terror under Lenin was no new phenomenon in Russian society, but was
preceeded by a rich legacy of Czarist absolutism and oppression. This
legacy points to a broad area of continuity between the policies of the
Czars and those practiced by the Soviet dictatorship. Indeed, many of
the methods used by the Czars to terrorize the Russian people, such as
a network of police enforcement and centralized political control, were
redeveloped by the Bolsheviks and made an intimate part of the Soviet
system.
The Terrorist Movement.--Terror in pre-revolutionary Russia was
not confined entirely to the Czars. The methods of terror were also
adopted by reactionaries rebelling against the oppressive rule of the
absolute monarchy. These radicals, as they were often called, eventually
organized themselves into a powerful terroristic movement.
^David Shub, Lenin (New York, 1958), p. 12.
2
Name given to the day on which many peacefully assembled workers
were massacred by Czarist palace guards.
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In the beginning the terrorist sought to compel Czarist reforms
through acts of violence. As this movement began to take on revolutionary
overtones, its aim was expanded to include the complete destruction of
Czarist rule and the radical reconstruction of the Russian state. In
this newly established state the peasantry would be the most powerful
class and a foundation upon which the government would be built.
The two outstanding figures among the men of action who came to
dominate Russian radical thought and revolutionary y tactics were Michael
Bakunin and Sergey Nechayev.^ "’Bakunin, nobleman and former artillery
officer, preached the abolition of hereditary property, advocated the
transfer of land to agricultural communes and factories to labor
associations."^ The abolition of the state was his keynote. His credo
was that the entire structure of society must be demolished before a
new and better one could be built.^
Nechayev, the son of a priest, became Bakunin's disciple and
passionately embraced the cause of the revolution. "In 1869 he organized
a society in Moscow for the purpose of preparing a mass insurrection. He
shrank from nothing to attract followers, resorting to deceit, terrorism,
4
and murder. Assuming the role of spokesman for the radical oppositionist,
Nechayev expressed the task of the terrorist movement as being "terrible,
^Michael T. Florinsky, Russia (New York, 1958), II, 1070.
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universal and merciless destruction."^ In attempting to carry out this
primary goal, he joined with Bakunin in explicitly outlining the opera¬
tional code of all successful revolutionist. In their Catechism Nechayev
and Bakunin wrote:
The revolutionist is a doomed man. He has no private
interest, no affairs, sentiments, ties, property nor even
name of his own.... Heart and soul, not merely by word,
but by deed, he has severed every link with the social
order and the...civilized world.... He is its merciless
enemy and continues to inhabit it with only one purpose -
to destroy it.... Everything which promotes the success
of the revolution is moral, everything which hinders
it is immoral.... The nature of the true revolutionist
excludes all romanticism, all tenderness, all ecstasy,
all love.2
This work was to have importance consequences for the world, since it was
probably read by Lenin and thus influenced the course of the Bolshevik
O
revolution.
"Fanatically devoted to the cause, Nechayev believed that the end
justifies the means. To build himself up as leader he used the crudest
artifices, such as spreading of news concerning his sham arrests, escapes,
and even death, and when he came to doubt the blind obedience of his as¬
sociate and fellow student Ivan Ivanov, he decreed and carried out his murder^
The crowning act in the career of the terrorists was the assassi¬
nation of Czar Alexander II on March 13, 1881. The hopes that this act
would strike fear into the heart of the new Emperor were soon shattered.
^Robert Payne, The Terrorists (New York, 1957), p. xi.
2
Cited in Shub, op. cit., p. 15.
3
Payne, op. cit., p. 27.
4
Florinsky, op. cit., p. 1071.
25
In a manifesto dated May 13, 1881, Alexander III proclaimed: "In the
midst of our great grief the voice of God commands us to stand bravely
at the helm of the state, to trust Divine Providence, with faith in the
power and truth of Absolutism.''^
"Five participants in the assassination were executed, most of
the party leaders were sentenced to long prison terms and Siberian exile.
A score, including Vera Figner, the 'Madonna of the Schlusselburg', were
immured for decades in the dungeons of the famous fortress, where some
died and others went insane."^
The terrorist who emerged in Russia in the second half of the
last century were men who saw that the dynasty could be overthrown only
by terror. They terrorized the Czar and the ruling bureaucracy, but
they did not succeed in their aim of making Russia better for the peasants.
They were the proud amateurs of revolt who prepared the way for pro¬
fessionals.
Their importance in history lies in the fact that they
weakened the Russian state to an extent which helped to
bring the Bolsheviks to power. And it is impossible
to understand the rise of Communism without an under¬
standing of the terrorist movement. In the place of
individual acts of terror, the Communist introduced
mass terror first against the terrorists, the men
they feared most deeply.^
"Nechayev and his followers advocated the use of deception, calumny,
and murder for the attainment of their objectives. They regarded the
^Shub, op. cit., p. 18.
^Ibid.
3
Payne, op. cit., pp. xiii-xiv.
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Russian people mainly as a means toward their apocalyptic end, envisag¬
ing either ideal anarchy or the dictatorship of a minority ruling by
means of unlimited force and terror.^ These ideas did not fade with
the death of their creators, but survived to play a decisive role in
the history of Russia and the world. To illustrate this point, one of
Lenin's biographers relates that "although he turned to the teaching of
Marx, his whole being was profoundly influenced by the conflicting cross¬
currents of the revolutionary movement. At the time of his brother's
death--and before he had read a word of Marx--Lenin was already drawing
from the demoniac visions of Bakunin and Nechayev."^
Methods of Bolshevik Rule
The overthrow of the Provisional Government by social revolutionaries
transformed the Bolsheviks at one stroke from a revolutionary to a
governing party. The power of the government slipped into the street.
Lenin and his Bolsheviks picked it up. It was now their task to create
a discipline and to give coherence and form to a land of fragment.
Relying upon the guidance provided by Marxist philosophy, Lenin
sought to establish on a firm footing the dictatorship of the proletariat
and the complete ascendancy of the Bolshevik Party operating as the van¬
guard of the revolution. To his dismay, he soon found that the Marxist
intellectual armory offered little in the way of precise guidance in
the art of establishing a revolutionary government. Lenin's pamphlet
^Shub, op. clt.. p. 19.
^Ibid.
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The State and Revolution, written while he was in hiding in August and
September 1917, bore on the subject; but as a guide for the construction
of the socalist state, it left much to be desired.^
Marxist theory envisaged the revolutionary coup taking place in an
industrial society in which the proletariat would be the most populous
class and the backbone of the economy. In this instance, the dictator¬
ship of the proletariat would be the dictatorship of the majority over
the minority--the exploited over the bourgeoise exploiters. The power
of the state would be used to crush the bourgeoise and afterwards
eventually wither away. Thus according to Marx, the dictatorship of
the proletariat would represent the highest form of democracy.
"This democratic refuge was denied to Lenin and the Bolsheviks.
The Russian industrial proletariat was a small minority in an over¬
whelming agrarian country. To exercise power in the proletariat was
to impose the rule of the few on the many; the dictatorship of the
2
Russian proletariat was by definition a minority dictatorship." The
dictatorship of this small minority over the majority of other powerful
elements in society brought to Bolshevik rule strong opposition from
many sectors of Russian society.
To reckon with the problems of putting the many factions of the
state into some semblance of order and destruction of active opposition,
Lenin proceeded to construct a twofold discipline: "one an imitation of
^Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled (Cambridge, 1958), p. 121.
^Ibid., p. 122.
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a semi-barbarous past, the other an inspiration from a more enlightened
future. One was terror and one was leadership. One came from without
and from above, the other from within and promotion of the best brains
and the best hearts of the Russian people and calling itself the
"diitinctly" inappropriate name of the party.^
Through the combined operation of these crucial organs of power,
Lenin and the early Bolsheviks were able to establish on a permanent
basis their revolutionary government and lay the foundation for the dic¬
tatorial character of the Soviet state.
The Party.--Upon seizing the reins of authority, Lenin sought to
discredit other revolutionary parties who had helped to bring the new
government into existence and establish the monolithic control of all
governmental organs in the hands of the Bolsheviks. In light of this
drastic move five of the 15 members of the Congress of Soviet issued
the following statement:
We take the stand that it is necessary to form a
socialist government of all parties in the Soviet.
We believe that only the formation of such a
government can preserve the fruits of the heroic
war won by the working class....
We deem the alternative to be a Bolshevik govern¬
ment which can maintain itself only by means of
political terror. It is this last named alterna¬
tive which the Soviet of People's Commissars has
chosen. We cannot and will not accept it. We
can see that it will alienate the proletarian
masses and cause their withdrawal from political
leadership; it will lead to the establishment of
^Sir John Maynard, Russia In Flux (New York, 1948), p. 279.
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an irresponsible regime and to the ruin of the revo¬
lution and the country. We cannot assume responsibi¬
lity for such a policy, and, therefore, we give up
the name of the People's Commissars.^
The sentiments of this retreating faction from the Congress of
Soviet proved to be prophetic, for with the dissolution of the Consti¬
tutional Assembly in 1918, the last democratic Russian body, the final
liaison between the Bolshevik party and other members of the Congress
of Soviets was broken. This situation yielded to the Bolsheviks supreme
authority over governmental apparatus. As a result, all the foes of the
Bolsheviks, Socialist and anti-Socialist alike, took up arms against
the Soviet power, thereby transforming the Bolshevik government into
the dictatorship of the Communist party.^
The party is one of several of Lenin's contributions to Marxist
theory. He originally described it as "the vanguard of the proletariat"
which guides the masses both before and after the revolution.^ Hence,
it is the duty of the party to run the executive and bureaucratic organs
of government, interpret the ideology and lead the state through the
various stages of evolution and ultimately to the supreme utopia--the
withering away of the state and the establishment of a classless society.
Acting through the organs of the party, Lenin molded the rigid
dictatorial character of the Soviet state, which has subsequently been
^Fainsod, op. cit., p. 123.
^Frederick Schuman, Russia Since 1917 (New York, 1957), p. 102.
^R. N. Carew Hunt, The Theory and Practice of Communism (New
York, 1961), p. 151.
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perpetuated throughput the years since his death. In his insistence on
strict party discipline, total obedience to the will of the dictatorship
and unquestioning acceptance of the ideological program (as formulated
by the leader), Lenin charted the path so successfully followed by
Stalin.^
These policies launched Soviet Russia on her path to dictatorship
by depriving the population of the weapons necessary to check the arbi¬
trary use of political power. Institutions and associations in the
state became optical illusions behind which the party remained in control.
This absence of any semblance of democratic restraints on power had the
damaging effect of giving moral sanction to the unmitigated use of
terror as an instrument of party domination.
Leninist methods of absolute rule by a small elite, acquired a
momentum of their own, a vested interest in their own survival which
has outlived their creator and perpetuated his system of rule long
after the forces which shaped them have been forgotten.
The Terror.--It was Lenin who formally introduced the terror in
the U.S.S.R, His methods of sifting out opposition and destroying petty
bourgeoise elements set the pattern for what has become an institutionali¬
zation of terror as a power weapon in the Soviet System.
Even before ascending to the seat of authority, Lenin expressed
his willingness to use violent means to attain or retain power. He
^Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dicta¬
torship and Autocracy (New York, 1962), p. 27.
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boldly asserted in 1901, "we have never rejected terror on principle nor
can we do so."^ From this point of view, the terror was a device the
Bolsheviks should not hesitate to use when the situation called for it.
Lenin's politics of terror reached such austere proportions even
in the early stages, that Maxim Gorky was prompted to write in his paper
Novaya Zhizn:
Blind fanatics and unscrupulous adventurers are rushing
head long forward toward 'social revolution'--as a matter
of fact it is the road to anarchy, the ruin of the pro¬
letariat and revolution.
The working class cannot fail to realize that Lenin is
experimenting with its blood and trying to strain the re¬
volutionary mood of the proletariat, the responsibility
for, the disgraceful senseless, and bloody crimes for
which not Lenin, but the proletariat will have to account.
The atrocities committed in the name of the revolution during this
period were not accidental abuses of authority: The Red Terror, as it
was called, was an organized and integral element in the process of sub¬
jecting the nation to Bolshevik will. In his book. Our Secret Allies,
Eugene Lyons describes Lenin's attitude toward violence as an expedient
revolutionary weapon. He reports that upon receiving news of a decree
abolishing capital punishment--and an orgy of executions, Lenin,
...was furious. He raged at his colleagues for giving
in to what he called the 'intelligensia bred prejudice'
against taking life. Did these dolts expect that with¬
out exuberant killing they could hold a nation that
detested them.^
^Barrington Moore, Jr., Soviet Politics--The Dilemma of Power,
(Cambridge, 1959), p. 73.
^Shub, op. cit., p. 140.
^Eugene Lyons, Our Secret Allies (New York, 1953), p. 98.
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In this initial period, Trotsky was to write later, "Lenin at
every opportunity kept hammering into our heads that terror was un¬
avoidable'.'^
Pointing up the ruthless character of Leninist terror, David
Shub relates an alleged story of a meeting attended by Lenin and his
police chief Dzerhinsky, in which he asked Dzerhinsky, "How many
vicious counter-revolutionary are there in our prison? Dzerhinsky
returned the answer of fifteen-hundred. Upon receiving this reply,
Lenin put a small cross by the figure and passed it back to Dzerhinsky.
The next day information was received that all fifteen-hundred prisoners
had been shot. As a cynical footnote to this tragic drama, it was
later found that Lenin put a cross on all communication he received
to indicate that it had been read and absorbed. Thus the execution
O
of the fifteen-hundred prisoners had been a mistakel'
During the period of Red Terror, according to Eugene Lyons,
"every policeman, every armed guard, every Chekist, became a law into
himself and dealt out death arbitrarily. The hideous principle that
it is better to kill thousands of innocents than risk the escape of
one guilty person was made official dogma.This fact possibly prompted




^Shub, op. cit., p. 157.
^Lyons, op. cit., p. 104.
^Cited in Shub, op. cit., p. 164.
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Hordes of men, women and children were rounded up almost at random as
hostages, to await death for anti-Soviet actions not yet committed by
others,^
The grave repressive measures used to solidify Bolshevik control
over the Soviet state set a precedent that was to be mirrored in an
even more repulsive manner during the reign of Stalin,
Bolshevik Machinery of Terror
The genealogy of the Bolshevik apparatus of terror reaches back
O
to the first weeks after the seizure of power. In pre-revolutionary
days, the Bolsheviks had occasion to acquire an intimate familiarity
with the operation of Tsarist Okhrana or secret police; the lessons
they learned then were later to be applied and amplified, Lenin quickly
decided that the Bolsheviks would have to develop their own Okhrana.^
In time of peace, a long-established government with no possible
rivals may with impunity abstain from the creation of such an agency,
or may achieve the feat of making a moderate use of its terrible powers.
"■Normally--because every government has a duty to preserve itself or
resign its function to another--the existence of a political police is
inevitable, because it is the eyes and ears of the public authority,
and often the hands too.'"^
Lyons, op, cit.
2
Fainsod, op, cit., p. 357.
^Ibid.
Slaynard, op. cit., p. 280
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On December 20, 1917, Lenin instructed Dzerhinsky, commandant of
Smolny, to organize an Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter
Revolution and Speculation.^ Under the Name Cheka, this Soviet secret
police soon became the symbol for a system of terror such as the world
had never seen. In later years its name was changed to OGPU, NKVD,
MVD, but its purpose remained the same. Dzevzhivsky became the first head
of the Cheka.^
In the first months of its existence, the Cheka shared its power
with the other groups in the state possessing official sanction to root
out and liquidate the bourgeoise. But with the expansion of the threat
against the survival of new regime, the Cheka acquired a monopoly on
this task and spread its net more widely. According to Fainsod:
...the Cheka ordered all local Soviets to seek out, arrest,
and shoot immediately all members...connected in one form
or another with counter-revolutionary organizations...
(1) enemy agents and spies, (2) counter-revolutionary
agitators, (3) speculators, (4) organizers of revolt...
against the Soviet government, (5) those going to the
Don to join the...Kaledin-Kornilov band and the
Polish counter-revolutionary legions, (6) buyers and
sellers of arms to equip the counter-revolutionary
bourgeoise...all these are to be shot on the spot...
when caught red-handed in the act.3
As the Cheka broadened the scope of its activities, it developed
a vested interest in jealously guarding its position as the official organ
of liquidation. The tendency of the Cheka to set itself above and beyond
^Shub, op. cit., p. 156.
^Ibid.
fainsod, op. cit. , p. 358.
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the law aroused concern even in Bolshevik ranks. At the second All-
Russian Conference of Commissars of Justice held in Moscow July 2-6,
1918,
Comrade Lebetev...pointed out that granting the necessity
for the existence of the Extraordinary Commissions, it
was nevertheless important to delimit their sphere of
activity...Otherwise we shall have a state within a state,
with the former tending to widen its jurisdiction more and
more....
Comrade Terastvatsaturov said that...in the provinces the
question of the activities of the Extraordinary Commissions
is a very acute one. The Commissions do everything they
please.... The president of our Cheka in Orel said: 'I
am responsible to no one; my powers are such that I can
shoot anybody.
The feeble reply to this criticism of Chekist abuse was, according
to Fainsod, that "so long as the Cheka functions, the work of justice
must take secondary place and its sphere of activity must be considerably
2
curtailed."
"The Cheka was more than a political police in the ordinary sense.
It included a frontier army; it provided guards at markets, railway
stations and river points; it assumed responsibility for the reclamation
of wait children of whom war and famine had left a terrible legacy; it
possessed reformatory prisons for the treatment of ordinary non-political
crimes, the inmates of which were patients rather than prisoners.^ How¬
ever, its primary role as the liquidator of the opposition remained its
hh±d. , p. 359.
^Ibid., pp. 359-360.
p. 282.Maynard, op. cit. ,
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most important service to the state.
The twentieth anniversary of the establishment of the Cheka was
accompanied by organized ovations, at which time the public demanded
the continuance of the good work. A poem in the principal communist
daily romanticized the function by calling it Razryedka, which means
the military reconnaissance of the enemy's forces, and so has associa¬
tions with the defense of the Father land against armed attack.^
Day and night we are on guard.
Day and night we keep the fight.
The foe is wise, we are wiser.
The foe is strong, we are stronger.
All the peoples of the Soviets will help us.
To burn to cinders the enemy's nest.^
The tradition of police brutality introduced into the Soviet system
by Lenin was in the beginning used as a means of smashing the counter¬
revolutionary movement. After its usefulness for this purpose was finished
it was not dissolved, for with the destruction of this opposition the
Soviets interpreted other non-conformist springing from its roots. Hence
the need for a political police to maintain state defence against active
opposition has witnessed its perpetuation as an institutionalized ingredient
of the Soviet system. Khrushchev explicitly underscored the importance
of the political police as late as April 1956, by declaring, "Our enemies
are hoping that we will relax our vigilance that we will weaken our
state security agency. No--this will never happeni The proletarian
^Ibid., p. 285.
2
Cited in Maynard, ibid.
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sword must always be sharp...,^
In essence, the instrument of terror bequeathed to Soviet Russia
by the brutal techniques of Lenin has perennially maintained a constant
vigil over the territory, prepared at a moments notice to stamp out any
significant opposition to party dominance with a force meaningful enough
to set an example for the world of society.
Momentum And Impact of Red Terror
"On Friday, August 30, 1918, Lenin was to speak at a labor rally
in Moscow, Among the members of this gathering was a woman who sat
close to the platform, resting her elbows on the table, listening care¬
fully to every word that was spoken, while nervously puffing one cigarette
after another."^
Lenin arrived on schedule and spoke for only a few minutes. Then
he descended the platform and made his way through the open hall surrounded
by loyal supporters. Among these in this group was the nervous chain¬
smoking woman.
At the door of the court building he was accosted by the same woman
who asked some questions. As he walked to his waiting automobile he made
a vain attempt to answer her. He had one foot on the running board when
she fired three shots at him point-blank, from a distance of only a few
feet. This attack on Lenin's life proved not to be fatal.
^Cited in Friedrich and Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 143.
'^Shub, op. cit., p. 163.
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The woman who had tried to assassinate Lenin was captured a few
blocks from the scene. She was brought to Lubianka later that night.
At the hearing she wrote:
My name is Fanya Kaplan...
Today I shot at Lenin. I
did it on my own. I will
not say from whom I obtained
the revolver. I will give no
details--! had resolved to
kill Lenin long ago. I con¬
sider him a traitor to the
Revolution...! favored the Con¬
stituent Assembly and am still
for it. ...My parents are in
the United States. They
emigrated in 1911. ! have
four brothers and two sisters.
They are all workers. ! was
educated at home. ! shot at
Lenin.^
!n Petrograd, on the same day Fanya Kaplan attempted to kill Lenin,
a young Jewish student named Leonid Kanegiesser assassinated the chief of
the Petrograd Cheka, Uritsky.
The murder of Uritsky and the attempt on Lenin set off a period
of unbridled terror in which the sword of the police was seldom to return
to its sheath. Kanegiesser was killed without trial, and Kronstadt
sailors added fuel to the rising flame of civil strife by shooting
nearly five hundred of the bourgeoise hostages held in the prison of
2the Baltic bastion. Hundreds of innocent persons were similarly




Lyon, op. cit., p. 109.
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Moscow prescribed stern action.
Done with weaknessj Done with sentimental considerations]
All Social Revolutionaries have to be arrested at once.
A large number of bourgeoise and officers; at the slightest
provocation or attempt at resistance or a move among white
Guard adherents, mass executions have to take place with¬
out fail.l
At the same time Pravda preached mass terror in the following
manner;
Workers and paupers, grab the rifle, learn how to shoot
be prepared for the uprising of the Kulaks and White
Guards. Stand up against Soviet Power. Ten bullets
to everyone who raises a hand against it....
The bourgeoise is our eternal enemy, forever boring
from within. The rule of capital will die with the
last breath of the last capitalist nobleman priest,
and army officer.^
And in Petrograd, the Red Gazette wrote after Uritsky's funeral:
For the death of our champion thousands of our enemies
will have to pay with their lives.... Kill so many, it
urged, that the enemies will choke themselves with their
own blood.3
Every other Soviet sheet played fiendish variations on the same
theme.
The professed aim of Red Terror was to exterminate the bourgeoise
as a class. But the term "bourgeoise" as interpreted by the Cheka became
elastic enough to include, at least potentially, every non-Bolshevik.
This fact motivated a high ranking Chekist official to admonish his
^Ibid.
O
^Cited in Shub, op. cit. , p. 164.
O
-^Cited in Lyon, op. cit.
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subordinates, "do not seek in the dossier of the accused for proofs
as to whether or not he opposed the Soviet government by word or deed.
The first question that should be put is to what class he belongs, of
what extraction, what education and profession. These questions should
decide the fate of the accused. Herein lie the meaning and essence of
Red Terror."^
The massacres coming in the wake of the attack on Lenin and murder
of Uritsky were designed to strike fear in the hearts of opponents of
the Bolsheviks. The former nobility and capitalist landlords consti¬
tuted the major groups at which this episode in terror was directed.
»
However, its sharp edge was not confined to this group, but was eventually
to include the White Guards, the clergy. Social Revolutionaries, Men¬
sheviks, and peasants who resisted requisitioning of grain or deserted
from the Red Army.
Exact figures on the number of persons to fall victim to Red Terror
have never been obtained. Some estimates put the total at approximately
500,000. Merle Fainsod espresses the belief that the actual total
rises high above this figure.^
This period in Russian history was a bloody one in which the normal
processes of justice were supplanted by an all-powerful organization
^Cited in Fainsod, op. cit., p. 359.
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See Fainsod, op. cit., p. 359.
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operating on a system of suspicion and fear. According to Vernadsky,
thousands suffered for the crime of opposing the dictatorship and more
thousands completely innocent of any political activities suffered with
them.^
Enemies of the people—bourgeoise--White Guardists--Kulaks--
noxious elements--These were categories without definition or boundaries.
In practice they meant torture and death for anyone who resisted or
might conceivably resist the dictatorship. Whatever it may have been in
theory, in practice Lenin's regime evolved into a system of self-
2defense of a small minority against their own people.
Leninist politics of terror had a profound effect on his successor,
Joseph Stalin. In a very real sense, Lenin's methods of expediency
became under Stalin the hardened policy of the Soviet dictatorial
system.
^George Vernadsky, A History of Russia (New Haven, 1954), p. 298.
^This was the verdict of Paul Milinkov in his Russia Today and To¬
morrow (New York, 1922), cited in Lyons, op, cit., p. 110.
CHAPTER III
STALIN AND THE REIGN OF TERROR
Expansion of the Leninist Legacy
Lenin's Ban on Intra-Party Democracy.--
We communists are people of a special material. We
are those who comprise the army of the great
proletarian strategist, the army of Comrade Lenin.
There is nothing higher than the honor of belonging
to this army.... In departing from us. Comrade
Lenin bequeathed to us the duty of holding aloft
and guarding the purity of the great title of
member of the party. We vow to you Comrade Lenin,
that we will fulfill your bequest with honor....
In departing from us Comrade Lenin bequeathed to
us the duty of guarding the unity of our party
like the apple of our eye. We vow to you.
Comrade Lenin, that we will fulfill this bequest
of yours with honor.... In departing from us.
Comrade Lenin bequeathed to us the duty of
guarding and strengthening the dictatorship of the
proletariat. We vow to you. Comrade Lenin, that
we will spare no effort to fulfill also this
bequest of yours with honor....^
In these words, Joseph Stalin religiously pronounced a sacred pledge to
carry on the task begun by Lenin - the building of the Communifet party
and the Soviet state. If reflection on the reign of Stalin is instructive
this pledge proved not to be empty verbalism, but a prelude to his crafty
scheme to take over the helm of the Soviet government by clothing himself
in Lenin's mantle.
Cited in Frederick Schuman, Russia Since 1917 (New York, 1957), p. 138
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Lenin set the stage for Stalin's mass purge of the party by mani¬
festing extreme intolerance of any dissent or faction from the majority
position in the party. Hence, at the Tenth Party Congress he pushed
through a resolution condemning the ideas of the Worker's Opposition,
whose program called for trade union administration of industry, demo¬
cratic management of the party and reliance on the industrial proletariat
to direct state affairs. This resolution called for an unswerving and
systematic ideological struggle against these ideas, and declared the
propaganda of these ideas as being incompatible with membership in the
Russian Communist Party.^
The suppression of intra-party rivalry behind the disguise of
democratic centralism had a tremendous effect on the future of the party
and Soviet political environment. As Issac Deutscher explains:
To save the Revolution's conquest the party had to sup¬
press the spontaneous rhythm of the country's political
life. But in doing so, the party was mutilating its
own body and mind. From now on its members would fear
to express opinions which might on analysis be found
to reflect 'the pressure of alien classes.' Only the
highest authority could decide which view was Bolshevik
and proletarian and which was not. Matters of ideology
became mysteriously elusive; and the Politbureau became
the sole respository of revolutionary wisdom. Most
leaders were gradually losing touch with the feeling
of their follows since the traffic of ideas moved
one way - from the Politbureau downward. The party
was gradually to transform itself into a bureaucratic
machine.^
Lenin's intolerance of opposition within the party ranks was tempered
by a practical realization that differences of view within the party were
^Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled (Cambridge, 1958), p. 133.
2
Issac Deutscher, Stalin (New York and London, 1949), p. 226.
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unavoidable and that the function of the leader was to persuade first
and invoke sanctions only as a last resort. When he became confronted
with the task of levying the ultimate penalty, usually after much
pleading and attempts at compromise, it very rarely went beyond temporary
expulsion. This allowed the dissenter to think over his position, recant
and thus once more become steeped in party affairs.
Yet the body of precedents which he created became the pivotal
pillows upon which the outlawing of dissent in the Soviet system became
legitimized. As the party encompassed the political life of the nation
and imposed a monolithic pattern on it, the party leadership became the
exclusive sanctuary of power and orthodoxy.^
From this time forth, there could be no right way but the party's;
no true interpretation of Marxist theory except that interpreted by
the party elite and handed down through the ranks of lower party
functionaries. The political environment of the Soviet system began
to take on the character of a military establishment in which it became
the duty of the party leadership, like generals, to command, and the
obligation of the rank and file, like privates, to respond with blind,
unquestioning obedience.
"The supreme leader, Stalin, became vested with a Godlike in¬
fallibility. Pronouncements were treated as the incarnation of divine
wisdom; his decisions brooked no dispute. The political monopoly of
^Fainsod, op. cit., p. 138.
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the party was transformed into the personal supremacy of the dictator."-*-
Stalin's Road to fower.--Joseph Stalin climbed the ranks of the party
hierarchy through the strategic vantage point of the Organization Bureau
and later the Secretaryship. From his position in these agencies, he was
able to manipulate important positions in the lower ranks and thus
develop a network of control which eventually developed into the highest
organs of the state. Clearly recognizing the danger of this situation,
Lenin wrote in what has been termed his Testament,
Comrade Stalin, having become General Secretary, has
concentrated on enormous power in his hands;
and I am not sure that he always knows how to use
that power with sufficient caution.,..
Later, he added these words as a postscript to this document:
Stalin is too rude, and this fault entirely supportable
in relations among us Communist, becomes insupportable
in the office of General Secretary. Therefore, I
propose to the Comrades to find a way to remove Stalin
from this position and appoint to it another man who in
all respects differs from Stalin only in superiority -
namely, more patient, more loyal, more polite, more
attentive to comrades, less capricious, etc.^
But Lenin's Will could not prevail against Stalin's will, and the
innate dynamics of the machine which Lenin himself had set in motion.
Stalin did not allow this revealing document to be published in Russia.
Utilizing fully the legacy of complete party unanimity bequeathed
by Lenin, Stalin set out on a calculated endeavor to firmly entrench his
power by eliminating all opposition to his absolute control of the party
^Ibid.
O
Cited in Leon Trotsky, The Real Situation in Russia (London, n.d.),
p. 323.
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and state apparatus. This task was accomplished in three stages. The
first was concerned with removing Trotsky as Lenin's heir apparent.
Thus, he joined with Zinoviev and Kamenev to form a triumvirate whose
immediate goal was the destruction of Trotsky. During this period,
Stalin gave the illusion of being the apostle of moderation and restraint,
wrapping himself in the mantle of Leninism and, as the loyal pupil of
Lenin, accused Trotsky and his associates of violating the "Resolution
of Party Unity" which Lenin himself had drafted.^
In the second stage, he proceeds to destroy the power of Zinoviev
and Kamanev on the Left, by joining with Tomsky, Rykov and Bukharin on
the Right to form a new majority coalition.
The final state was concerned with solidifying his power by annhi-
lating the Rightist opposition. These allies, whom Stalin mobilized
to destroy the Left, eventually suffered the same fate as all other
oppositionist to Stalin's march to power - expulsion from the party and
removal from party post.
With the destruction of the Rightist Opposition, Stalin's power
became so complete that the delegates at the Seventeenth congress in
January, 1934, vied with each other in proclaiming fealty to him. Not
a single note of jarring criticism disturbed the monolithic serenity of
the congress.
Lenin defeated his opponents by debate tempered with a
touch of organizational maneuver and frame-up; but once
they were rendered impotent, he was careful to salvage
the person and dignity, of the defeated opponent. But
Stalin could not win by debate. His method was to
Fainsod, op. cit., p. 139.
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enlarge the organizational maneuvers and frame-ups which
were already a part of Lenin's techniques, to compel his
opponents to bemirch themselves and liquidate themselves
morally by repeated confessions. Then he killed them.1
Apex Of Terror: The Great Purge
The era of the Great Purge under Stalin brought terror to unparalleled
proportions in the U.S.S.R. Utilizing the most potent technological
devices at his command, Stalin's coercive arm penetrated even the most
private sanctums of Soviet society. His perennial search for the enemies
of the people, for the deviant from the Marxist norm, for the challenge
or potential challenge to the overriding power of the dictatorship, can
only be classified as a reign of brutally unmitigated terror.
This period of human carnage began with the assassination of Serge
Kirov, Secretary of the party in Leningrad, by a young oppositional
communist named Nikolayez. The death of Kirov constituted the first
murderous attack on a prominent Bolshevik within the limits of the U.S.
S,R,, and it profoundly shook the confidence of the government in the
efficiency of its police and security leaders.^ This situation produced
an atmosphere of increasing suspicion internally aggravated by external
manifestations of capitalist encirclement and imminent foreign attack.
Stalin exploited this touchy situation to settle accounts with
his old arch-rivals Zinoviev, Kamanev and Trotsky, He announced that
the assassination of Kirov was the work of a counter-revolutionary group
led by the followers of Zinoviev and Kamanev and financed by foreign
agents.
^Bertram D. Wolfe, Six Keys To The Soviet System (Boston, 1956), p. 11.
2
Sir John Maynard, Russia In Flux (New York, 1948), p, 286.
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To compensate for the loss of his "dear" colleague and to break
up the far-reaching coalition which he alleged was bent on his assassi¬
nation and the destruction of the Soviet regime, he ordered the execu¬
tion of Nikolayez and scores of persons accused of being associated with
him in the devious plot. This event was accompanied by the arrest and
imprisonment of thousands of Leningrad inhabitants who were suspected of
harboring opposition sentiments. In the sardonic nomenclature of exile
and concentration camp, they came to be referred to collectively as
"kirov's assassins".^
On January 17, 1935, Zinoviev was sentenced to 10 years in jail,
Kamanev and other defendants to varying terms, all for knowing of the
plot against Kirov and failing to act.^ During this phase of the Purge
the primary targets were members of three groups, Trotsky-Zinoviev
group; (2) left-wing opposition inside the party; and (3) old Bolsheviks
suspected of harboring sympathies for the Trotsky-Zinoviev group.
In 1936, the climax was reached with the staging of three dramatic
public trials in which both members of the right and left were indicated
as being intimately connected with the cynical plot to overthrow the
Soviet government. All the accused gave candid confessions and were sub¬
sequently either shot or sentenced to long jail terms.^ Among the victims
executed during this time were Zinoviev and Kamanev.
The show trials acted as a public signal for a general sweep of
blood-letting which eventually encompassed the whole of Soviet society.
^Yezhov, op. cit., p. 367.
2
Schuman, op. cit., p. 185.
3
For a list of these victims, charges and duration of sentences, see
Schuman, op. cit., pp. 186-187.
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The party began expelling members by the thousands and the NKVD was
carrying out mass arrest of even greater numbers. Officials as well as
humble citizens anxious to prove their loyalty, or motivated by fear,
hatred or ambition, took part in a rapidly increasing movement of denunciation.
Reliance upon the secret police as a means of carrying out the
politics of purgatory, carried on during this period, enabled it to
acquire a tremendous amount of autonomous power independent of party con¬
trol. In an effort to bring the police back under party supervision, and as
a means of obtaining scapegoats for the tensions building up in the wake
of increasing violence, the purgers were purged. Yogoda, head of the
secret police, was replaced by N. I. Yezhov, who directed the purge to
its greatest height.
Victims of the Yezhovschina^ included not only formal opposition, but
many of the most stalwart supporters of Stalin in his protracted struggle
with the "enemy of the people." Among those arrested, imprisoned, and
executed was a substantial portion of the leading figures in the party
and government hierarchy.
No sphere of Soviet life, no matter how lofty was left
untouched. The arrest of an important figure was
followed by the seizure of the entourage which surrounded
him. The apprehension of the members of the entourage led to
imprisonment of their friends and acquaintances.2
Arrests mounted into the millions, thus supplying Soviet labor camps
3
with a hefty number of residents. The vast resources of the NKVD were
Name given to the period of the purge directed by Yezhov, head of
the NKVD.
2
Fainsod, op. cit., p. 373.
3
It is a commonly known fact that most of the prisoners were utterly
bewildered by the fate that had befallen them.
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concerned with the single objective of documenting the existence of
a huge conspiracy to undermine Soviet power. Under the zealous
questioning and abuse of NKVD examiners, thousands of innocent citizens
9
were transformed into traitors, terrorist, and enemies of the state.
An explanation of the ever-widening character of Stalin's mass
purge has been attempted by Issac Deutscher; he writes:
Stalin could not be sure that avengers of his victims
would not rise from the ranks of his followers. Having
destroyed the first team of potential leaders of an
alternative government, he could not spare the second,
the third, the fourth and Nth teams.1
The final phase of this macabre drama occurred with the purging of
the purgers once again. This consequence was brought about when the
momentum of the purged became self-defeating and threatened to destroy
the whole of society in its midst. Hence, the secret police was greatly
weakened by the wholesale arrest and liquidation of its most powerful
officials.
Yezhov was succeeded by Lavrenti Beria who gradually released the
yoke of oppression. By March 1939, it was over.^ Thousands of prisoners
were released from camps and reinstated to their former positions; many
expelled party members were rehabilitated and allowed to come back into
the fold; and exiles were now free to set foot on their homeland again.
Complete restoration, however, was indeed an impossibility. Thousands
of citizens were either dead or mysteriously lost; and many others,
although once more free, were broken in spirit and body. When the dust
^Deutscher, op. cit., p. 380.
2
Harcave, op. cit., p. 619.
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had settled, the inner fabric of Soviet society had been gruesomely
damaged.
ANALYSIS OF THE GREAT PURGE
Effect on Party.--The ravages of the purge extended through the
entire party and government apparatus; the list of eliminated read like
a who's who of Soviet celebrities. Among the most important to fall
victim to Stalin's purge of the party were: Karl Radek, a brilliant Polish
Jew, at one time a close friend of Trotsky, and thereafter principal
editor of Izvestia (sentenced to 10 years imprisonment); Gregory Sokoluikov,
who built up the Soviet currency, was Vice-President of the State Planning
Committee, Ambassador to Great Britain and Assistant Commissar of Foreign
Affairs (10 years imprisonment); L. P. Serebriakov, railway chief (shot);
N. F. Muralov, the Bolshevik giant, a famous fighter and the henchman
of Trotsky in the Civil War (shot); N. N. Krestinsky, formerly Assistant
Commissar of Foreign Affairs (shot); A. C. Rukovsky, once Chairman of
the People's Commissars in the Ukraine, later Ambassador to London and
Paris (20 years imprisonment); A. I. Rykov; former member of the Right
Opposition (shot); and Nikolai Bukharin, brilliant intellectual and
former Right Oppositionist (shot).^
In tallying the total extent of damage to the party wrought by
the Great Purge, the mounting figures stagger the imagination. Of 138
members and alternates of the Central Committee, only a score or so
remained at liberty; the rest were killed, imprisoned or demoted. Of
^Eugene Lyons, Our Secret Allies (New York, 1953), p. 190.
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the 757 members of the Tzik, theoretically the Soviet "parliament,"
only a few dozen survived. In the ruling party 1,800,000 members and
candidates were stripped of their communist status, more than half the
total, and usually that meant anything from exile and concentration
camp to death.^
According to Friedrich and Brzezinski, "through the purging of
more than a million party members, the consolidation of the Stalinist
dictatorship was achieved."^ Thus Stalin was not boasting idly when
he declared that.
When it had smashed the enemies of the people and purged
the party and Soviet organizations of degenerates, the
party became still more united in its political and
organizational work and rallied even more solidly around
its Central Committee.^
What he neglected to add, however, was that the Central Committee itself
lost about 75 per cent of its membership.^
Impact on Society.—"The ntmiber of little people who fell under
the hammer of the purge cannot be estimated. No public accounting was
given.The victims ran into the thousands and included whole
categories of people whose 'objective characteristics' could be broadly
construed as inclining them to anti-Soviet behavior. "In truth, no one
escaped the tragedy, living amidst the thunderous fears and threats and
^Ibid.
p
Carl J. Friedrich and Zbignew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictator¬
ship and Autocracy (New York, 1962), p. 153.
^Ibid.
^Ibid.
^Schuman, op. cit., p. 187.
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uncertainties of the time. Undoubtedly millions who did not actually
pass through the purge process remained liquidated in mind and spirit
by the sheer waiting and dreading."^
Throughout the Stalinist era, the Great Purge administered grave
repercussions on Soviet society. The party rose as a small but monolithic
unit coalescing around Stalin's will. There was absolutely no room for
dissent or faction. In the monolithic party, as well as in other Soviet
institutions, the last vestiges of free debate and open disagreement were
now gone; the party now expected unanimous assent and support for all
decisions handed down from above and reverence of Stalin that verged on
"idolatry'*^.
A tjrpical example of the tendency to deify Stalin can be found in
a work published on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday by his closest
co-workers. An article by Khrushchev expressed sentiments in this manner:
The enemies of the people view Comrade Stalin as their
most dangerous foe. The imperialist of all countries know
full well that every word uttered by Comrade Stalin is
endorsed by the multi-national Soviet people.... In
Comrade Stalin, the working class and all toilers possess
the greatest man of the present era, a theoretician,
leader and organizer of the struggle and victory of the
working class and all toilers against capitalism and for
communism.^
The coercive measures used in the purges became hardened into a fixed
pattern of the Soviet system. This system demanded absolute loyalty to
V. M. Molotov, A. M. Mikoyan, N. Khrushchev et al, Stalin (New
York, 1940), p. 41. Similar praises to Stalin's genius and God-like
character can be found in almost every passage in this work. It is of
interest to compare the above statement with Khrushchev's description
of Stalin in 1956. Infra, pp. 61-62,
54
the party and dictator with the threat of severe punishment for any
action which did not coincide with standardized norms. The secret police
became the coercive arm of the Politbureau and the Politbureau became
the whimsical puppet of Stalin. Fear of police brutality prevailed
throughout society and an atomizing process developed which threatened
the existence of even the most primary institutions.
Soviet citizens were also cut off from intimate contact with the
outside world. Travel arrangements abroad became the luxury of a select
few, and information media were increasingly placed under strict govern¬
mental control and supervision. Indeed, the cult of personality was the
order of the day.
The Show Trials.--Without a doubt the most bewildering aspect of the
Great Purge was the staging of three dramatic show trials in which the
defendants gave weird confessions of this nature:
Yes, we did form a clandestine terroristic organization
in 1932. Yes, we did receive and approve the instructions
from Trotsky to wipe out Stalin and his principal collaborates.
Yes, we did prepare the assassination of Kirov, and other
attendants, which failed. Yes, we do repent, we are aware
of the magnificient work of Stalin and our complete defeat
as oppositionist.... Yes, we are the basest of wretches,
the accomplices of the Gestapo, the instruments of fascism, we
do merit the supreme punishment. Yes, we do now admire the
gifted leader; we would like to live for him, we do consent to
die for him. Only one man in the world is worse than we,
more criminal, more fascistic, more vile and more perverse,
Trotsky.^
A number of the specific acts which the defendants admitted were
shown by independent investigation^ to have been physically impossible:
^Cited in Victor Sergei, Russia 20 Years After (New York, 1937), p. 217.
2
Much of it taken by a private commission established under the chair¬
manship of John Dewey to probe the truth behind the trials. For a compre¬
hensive survey of the findings of this committee, see Report of Committee of
Inquiry Into The Charges Against Leon Trotsky at the Moscow Trials, Not
Guilty (London, 1938).
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meetings at hotels long since dismantled, landings at airports where no
such planes had landed, and so forth.^
Why, then, did these defendants confess? These were no cowards,
but men who had spent life times in danger, who had faced death on
innumerable occasions, but who were not cringing, admitting their guilt,
beating their breasts. And yet none of them appeared to have been
tortured, drugged, or beaten. Even more, why did Stalin find it necessary
to stage such an obvious mockery of justice?
It is quite evident that these trials were never held in order to
ascertain whether or not the accused were guilty. The trials were public
demonstrations which were intended to create certain definite impressions
in the minds of the people. It is probable that, among other reasons,
they were staged to strike fear in the hearts of all who might be harbor¬
ing disloyal intentions, to divert public attention from public mis¬
fortune, and to create the opinion that effective action had been taken
2
to prevent a recurrence of the undesirable event or development.
Isaac Deutscher offers a further explanation by attributing the
blame to Stalin's psychological reasoning. According to Mr, Deutscher,
Stalin's reasoning probably developed along the following lines: "they
may want to overthrow me in a crisis - I shall charge them with having
already made the attempt if they succeed, they may be compelled to...
agree to a cession of territory.,.. I shall accuse them of having
^For corroboration, see Hoover, op. cit., pp. 30-31.
2
Deutscher, op. cit., pp. 377-378. A similar analysis is made
by Hannah Arendt, op. cit., p. 401,
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entered already into a treacherous alliance with Germany (and Japan.... No
milder pretext for the slaughter of the old guard would have sufficed....)"^
Thus, Deutscher explains away the show trials by indicating that only
complete open confessions by oppositionist of a grand design to overthrow
the government could assure public consent to the destruction of the
Bolshevik Old Guard and arouse public resistance against a threatening
Hitler attack.
This still leaves unanswered the problem of why these men confessed.
In attempting to answer this question, many explanations have been given.
Some writers, such as Arthur Koestler and W. G. Kritvitsky, argue that
the confession generated a final effort to do a last service to the party.
Kritvitsky records an incident in which a police examiner explained, "I
wept with him when we arrived at the conclusion that all was lost...that
the only thing to do was to make a desperate effort to forestall a fu¬
tile struggle on the part of the discontented masses. For this, the govern-
ment must have 'public confessions' by opposition leaders."
Still others assert the belief that the confessions were a pro¬
duct of constant physical intimidation and threat to family and friends.
While it is quite possible that police brutality and threats were a
motivating factor in achieving confessions, they do not explain why others
^Donald W. Treadgold, 20th Century Russia (Chicago, 1959), p. 281.
^W. G. Kritvitsky, In Stalin's Secret Service (New York, 1939),
p. 203.
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did not take the road of Krestinsky and repudiate their signed statements
in open court. This encounter between the prosecutor, Vishinsky, and
Krestinsky has been recorded in the following manner;
Vishinsky: When I interrogated you during the preliminary
investigation, were you telling the truth?
Krestinsky: No.
Vishinsky: Why did you mislead me?
Krestinsky: I simply considered that if I were to say what
I am saying today...my declaration would not reach the
leaders of the party and government.!
"That almost all prominent Bolshevik's of Lenin's day were arrested,
tried and most of them shot is hardly less incredible than the fact that
(only one) sought martyrdom by repudiating his confession. No record of
2
events in the history of totalitarian states is more awesome than this."
The fact that these men suffered dissillusionment to the point of
disgust with the results of their untiring work in the Communist party
might be a part of the explanation for the mysterious confessions. Men
only resort to martyrdom for ideals that seem to them all-important. But
martyrdom seems useless when all ideals have foundered and faith is
completely broken. Men of the caliber of Bukharin, Rykov and Zinoviev
could possibly be induced to fabricate tales of sabotage and betrayal
because the whole business ceased to matter. Their self-degradation
probably seemed trivial in the context of the degradation that had been
^Cited in Nathan Leites and Elsa Bernaut, Ritual of Liquidation
(Glencoe, 1954), p. 22.
^Hoover, op. cit., p. 34.
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administered to the revolution. Thus their confessions may be viewed
as attempts at irony - expressions of utter contempt.^
Meaning Behind The Violence.--The motivating forces behind Stalin's
decision to launch a drive of wide open terror in Russia have never been
completely verified, since we have no testimony from the source upon
which to draw definite conclusions. Thus one can only venture a range
of hypotheses upon which Stalin could have possibly based his action.
Stalin's desire to concentrate an ever-increasing amount of power
in himself tends to be one of the most likely possibilities; he could
best achieve this goal by eliminating the Old Bolshevik elements who
were remorseful about his usurpation of power and authority. The need
for scapegoats on which to blame the increased tensions derived from
force industrialization and collectivization might have also been a
strong motivating factor. These scapegoats acted as a means by which
attention was turned from the government's repressive measures to the
"enemy of the people" attempting to overthrow the state, thus permitting
the continuation of tension-producing policies. It is also possible
that many fell fictim to Stalin's iron hand because they were actually
seeking to overthrow him, not to return to a capitalist existence, but
to return to communist policies he had abandoned. Finally, his
organized blood-bath might have generated from his desire to build a
dynamic, efficient, monolithic party, by cleansing it of antiquated
^For a meticulous examination of the purge trials which tend to
substantiate this conclusion, see Max Eastman, Stalin's Russia (New York,
1940), pp. 52-80.
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ideas and degenerate members, and replace them with young, energetic
communist trainees, with fresh, new ideas.
The theory of the role of terror in Stalin's formula of government
is implicit in any understanding of the Yezhovzchina. As Fainsod so
brilliantly explains;
The consolidation of personal rule in a totalitarian system
depends on the constant elimination of all actual or poten¬
tial competitors for supreme power. The insecurity of the
masses must be supplemented by the insecurity of the governing
elite who surround the Supreme Dictator. The too strongly en¬
trenched official with an independent base of power is by
definition a threat to the dictator's total sway. The indivi¬
duals or groups who go uncontrolled and undirected are re¬
garded as fertile soil for the growth of conspiratorial
intrigue.^
The function of terror thus assumes a two-fold aspect. As a preventive
power weapon, it is designed to stamp out any impending opposition to
the primacy of the dictatorship. As an instrument for the reinforcement
of the personal power of the dictator, it is directed toward insuring
perpetual circulation in the ranks of office-holders in order to fore¬
stall the development of autonomous power by any of the various forces
and institutions operating as arms of the party. Critical reflection
on Stalin's personal rule reveals that he made effective use of terror
for both these purposes.
^Fainsod, op. cit., p. 373.
2
This policy has especially been applied to put a check on the
secret police whenever it began to gather enormous amounts of personal
power in its hand. Supra., p. 45.
CHA.PTER IV
DISSIPATION OF STALINISM
Decline Of The Cult Of Personality
Years since Stalin's death have been crucial for the USSR, crowned
with events behind which one can sense a change in climate. At times
abruptly and dramatically, and at times slowly and almost imperceptibly,
the Soviet Union has moved away from Stalinism.^
One of the most glaring manifestations of this revulsion from the
Stalinist past has been the decline of the "Cult of Personality", the
grotesque adulation of the leader. According to one source, "the dropping
of all but the most perfunctory references to Stalin was so swift, so
sudden as to be uncanny; it was as though a whole continent had vanished
O
from the face of the globe." In fact, the Stalin cult began to wither
as soon as its object had disappeared. The cold address at his funeral,
concerned with programs and power, testified to the fact that he had
exacted so much "posthumous" tribute while alive that there was no
O
reserve to call on after his death."Malenkov made far fewer genu¬
flections than Stalin had made at Lenin's bier; and there was on this
occasion no 'we swear to thee. Comrade Stalin.' Instead, Malenkov
devoted most of his speech to a succinct and sober expose of governmental
Issac Deutscher, The Great Contest (New York and London, 1960), p. 1.
2
Edward Crankshaw, Russia After Stalin (New York, 1956), p. 119.




In the coming weeks, much of the luster was to be rubbed from the
idol. Within a month after Stalin's death, his name had virtually dis¬
appeared from the Soviet press. Then, in the early summer of 1953, the
"^Kremlin doctors plot'*^ against the lives of high leaders was re-evaluated
as a "concoction of false allegations" by the police in general and
Lavrenti P. Beria (Stalin's police chief) in particular.
Further developments in this anti-Stalin campaign witnessed the
freeing of a few surviving Old Bolshevik leaders from their long imprison¬
ment, while the authorities set about ameliorating conditions in forced
labor camps generally. Similarly, a sweeping reorganization of the party
and government was soon announced. The Presidium of the party, elected
with so much flourish only four months prior to Stalin's death, was re¬
duced to about a third of its size. Fourteen ministries were merged
into five (and the merging continued at such a feverish rate that, by
O
March, forty-five ministries had been reduced to fourteen)."^ In the
distribution of offices some members of the Old Stalin Guard, Molotov
and Shvernik, suffered veiled or open demotion, while others, Voroshilov
and Kaganovich, who had been semi-eclipsed during Stalin's last years,
gained promotion.'^ In addition. Marshal Zhukov, the conqueror of Berlin,
^An alleged Jewish conspiracy to undermine Soviet power.
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whom Stalin had kept in obscurity since 1946, was brought back as Deputy
Minister of Defense.^
Hence, within weeks after his death a vigorous anti-Stalin operation
was underway, but observers did not suspect the assault would be pressed
to an all but open refutation of some of the most fundamental precepts
of Stalinism.
Official Denunciation of Stalinist Methods
Undercurrent rumbling and shrinking in pious borrow from the
Stalinist past throughout the Soviet hierarchy came to a climax at the
Twentieth Party congress in 1956, The world listened attentively while
this congress was in session. This was the first congress since the
death of Stalin, and, in the interim, events had prompted some bewilderment
and much speculation among interested observers everywhere. Specifically,
outside spectators looked to the congress to illuminate the pattern
underlying a series of developments between March, 1953, and February,
1956: the resignation of Georgi M. Malenkov as Premier; the ascendancy
to First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, Soviet assent to a peace treaty
with Austria, politically "neutralizing"" that country; Soviet withdrawal
from bases in Prokkala, Finland, and Port Arthur; the visits of
Khrushchev and Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin to India, Burma, and other
countries; the announced reduction of Soviet military forces and military
budget; the attempted rapproachment with Yugoslavia; initiation of unpre¬
cedented Soviet economic offensive and many other "unexpected" Soviet
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instigated moves.
This party congress from outside appearances did not seem to differ
radically from its predecessors. In eleven days, it sanctioned every¬
thing its "agents" on the Central Committee had done in a period of
three years and four months; confirmed the whole body of present and
future foreign and domestic policy; and heard about sixty separate but
highly stylized "warm fraternal greetings" from various communist par-
ties. In the Great Hall in which the congress took place, no tempers
were lost and no one quibbled over points of procedure. Yet undoubtedly
the pressing problem of what to do with Stalin's ghost, whose presence
saturated the congress environment, laid beneath this facade of peace
and serenity.
In his opening address, Khrushchev laid the grounds for the future
solution to this problem by underscoring the policy of collective leader¬
ship which had become one of the basic tenets of the new regime. He
conveyed the impression that one-man rule was a matter of the regrettable
past and that Soviet leadership was not split into contending cliques
but impersonally bound together by the "cause" to which it was morally
dedicated. "The leading core of the party is not a group of men bound by
personal relations of mutual advantage, but a working collective of lea¬
ders whose relations are based on ideas and principles permitting neither
mutual forgiveness nor personal antagonism."^
^Charles D. Kennedy, "The Twentieth C.P.S.U, Congress: A Study in





Giving a push to this initial endeavor, Mikhail A. Suslov, chief
of the propoganda apparatus under Stalin declared;
The theory and practice of the cult of personality...diminished
the role of the popular masses and the role of the party; lowered
collective leadership; undermined intra-party democracy;
suppressed the activity of the party members, their initiative
and independent work; led to lack of supervision, irresponsi¬
bility, and even the arbitrariness in the work of individual
persons; hindered the development of criticism and self- ^
criticism and sometimes even erroneous solution of problem.
Suslov guaranteed that the spread of "dogmatism and parrot-learning"
would be methodically counteracted. Thus in these first attacks on the
Stalinist legacy, efforts were made to pass over the issue of Stalin by
attacking the cult and not the individual who practiced it.
The initial attack on Stalin himself was delivered by Anastas I.
Mikoyan. He berated a Stalin book by musing, "In analyzing the state
of the economy in contemporary capitalism, it is doubtful that we can
be helped by—and it is doubtful if it is correct--Stalin's well-known
dictum in The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR...."^ More¬
over he intimated that party histories would be revised to expunge
deliberate distortions: "...Up to quite recently, we have had books...
which were current and were even regarded as an unchallenged yardstick
in which facts were falsified. Some persons were arbitrarily exalted in
them, others got no mention at all."^ Mikoyan ended his dissection by
^Ibid.
O
"Fight, Inside the Kremlin^" United States News and World Report.
June 15, 1956, p, 32.
^Cited in Kennedy, op. cit., pp. 766-767.
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sneering at the famous "Oath to Lenin", This oath, memorized by Soviet
school children for years in a form resembling prayer, was caustically
alluded to in these terms: "How great would be Lenin's joy if he now,,.,
could see that we not only swear by Lenin's name but are exerting our
efforts to put into practice Lenin's ideas and are fulfilling his be¬
quests reverently,"^
Aside from his sharp criticism of the Stalin cult, Mikoyan intro¬
duced into the discussions another novel element; his speech, more
extreme than others, had brought into the congress a certain dialectic
of positions of conflict which for some time had disappeared from party
meetings. No one went further than he, and he emerged, as it were, an
2
anchor man,"
In the weeks following the congress, it became increasingly evident
that the opening round had been fired in the bombardment of Stalinism,^
Apparently the leaders decided when Stalin died to unfold their ac¬
cusations gradually, aware that poor timing might incite elements of the
population conditioned by every medium of mass persuasion for more than
two decades to revere him as the symbol and infallible guiding hand of
Soviet society. Thus, nearly three years elapsed before the elite revealed
how far they intended to go.
^Ibid,
^Guiseppe Boffa, Inside the Khrushchev Era (New York, 1959), p, 35,
3
Kennedy, op. cit,, p. 768.
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About two weeks after the congress, Moscow confirmed persistent rumors
that Khrushchev had delivered a three-hour address, on February 24, to a
closed session of the congress in which he presented a detailed indictment.
The text of this "secret speech" is so blunt, yet so revealing, that it re¬
quires reading rather than resume. However, such a reproduction here would
extend far beyond the scope of this study. In view of this fact, a summary
of this speech by Issac Deutscher aptly serves our purpose. According to
Mr. Deutscher, Khrushchev characterized Stalin in the following manner:
Father of the People, immured as he was in the Kremlin refusing
over the last twenty-five years of his life to have a look at
a Soviet village--at the new collectivized village; refusing to
step down into a factory and face workers; refusing even to cast
a glance at the army of which he was Generalissmo, let alone to
visit the front; spending his life in a half-real and half-
fictitious world of statistics and mendacious propaganda films;
planning unleviable taxes; tracing front-lines of offensives on
a globe on his desk; seeing enemies creeping from every nook and
cranny; treating the members of his own politbureau as his con¬
temptible lackeys, denying Voroshilov admission to sessions,
slamming the door in Andreyev's face, or upbraiding Molotov and
Mikoyan: Choking his interlocutors morally and physically,
pulling the wires behind the great purge trials; personally
checking and signing 383 black lists with the names of thousands
of doomed party members; ordering judges and NKVD men to torture
the victims of the purges and to extract confessions; 'planning'
the deportations of entire peoples and raging impotently at the
size of the Ukranian people too large to be deported, growing sick
with envy at Khukov's military fame; shaking his finger at Tito
and waiting for Tito's imminent fall; surrounded by dense clouds
of incense and, like an opium eater, craving for more, inserting
in his own hand passages of praise to his modestly into his
official adulatory biography and into history textbooks; himself
designing huge, monstrously ugly, elephantine monuments to him¬
self; and himself writing his own name into the new national
anthem which was to replace the International,^
Thus did Khrushchev expose before his party the huge, grim, whimsical
morbid personality before whom the communist world lay prostrate in the
^Issac Deutscher, Russia in Transition (New York, 1957), p. 38.
67
course of a quarter of a century.
De-Stalinization: Myth and Reality
The open attacks on the cult of personality begun by the Twentieth
Party Congress filled the democratic world with surprise and delight for
they appeared to break an idol and repair some damage to the truth. This
situation introduced into Western thought acute anxiety that fundamental
change was taking place in the Soviet system which would banish forever
Stalin's legacy.
These hopes and aspirations were not in vain for the denigration of
Stalin's ruthless regime has seen some striking alternations of the social,
economic and political environment of the Soviet Union. Since his death
10 years ago, Joseph Stalin's image has changed from "Dear Father and Wise
Teacher" to that of a man who used lies and slander in a criminal manner
against his opponents.^ There is not a picture of Stalin to be seen in
public in Moscow and every passing day more scorn is heaped on the man who
ruled this nation for nearly thirty years. Today Stalin lies in an
obscure grave outside the Kremlin wall.
A visitor to Russia in the present Khrushchev era who has the oppor¬
tunity to meet a representative cross-section of the Soviet officials can¬
not fail to be impressed by a spirit of local initiative and self-confidence
2
which is in significant contrast to the political style of the Stalin era.
It is not without cause that in proposing Khrushchev's candidacy for Premier,
Voroshilov noted among other qualifications that "his talks with political
^"Red Life Better with Stalin Gone", Atlanta Journal, March 5, 1963,
p. 12.
^Cited in Black, ibid.
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leaders of various countries and with representatives of the world press
have considerally enlarged the circle of friends of our homeland and greatly
increased the Soviet Union's prestige on the international scene."
The official denunciation of Stalin's politics of terror has led to
the adoption of a policy known as the "new course" which promises, among
other things, the abandonment of one-man leadership for collective leader¬
ship, a greater concentration on consumer goods and a reduction of the
State Security Police, coupled with assurance that the rule of the law will
be respected. This policy has been accompanied by a rousing of moral
spirit and human initiative which seem to permeate the length and breadth
of Soviet society.
"The mind of the nation has stirred to new activity. Gone are the days
when the whole of the Soviet Union was on its knees before the leader and
had to intone the same magic incantations, to believe in the same bizzarre
myths, and to keep its thoughts tightly closed to any impulse of doubt and
criticism."^ A diversity of opinion, unknown for decades, has begun to
show itself unmistakably in many fields. "A fresh gust of wind is blowing
through the lecture halls and seminars of universities. Teachers and stu¬
dents are at last discussing their problems in relative freedom from inqui¬
sitional control and dogmatic inhibition."^ Writers have been inspired to
write real drama rather than the dull fairy tales prescribed by Stalinist
norms. Similarly, artists have of late ventured into the heretofore untrodden
area of abstract painting, rebuking Stalin's coerced affinity for still life
^Ibid.
^Deutscher, Russia in Transition, op. cit., p. 5.
^Ibid.
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portraits, landscapes, etc,,--"proletarian art".
"There is also increased tolerance toward deviation and dissent. During
the Twentieth Congress, Khrushchev and other leaders attended a recently re¬
vived play by Nikolai Pogodin, despite the fact that Pravda had severely
criticized the author."^ Such a thing would have been inconceivable in
Stalin's day. Recent years have also witnessed a marked increase in the
frankness of public statements, and still more in public speeches, as wit¬
nessed in Khrushchev's attack on Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress.^
These changes in Soviet outlook have been so stupendous that many scholars
have termed this period "the thaw"' symbolizing the melting away of Stalinist
oppression and a return to an appreciable state of normalcy.
The significance of these changes inevitably raises the question as to
how far they have penetrated the heart and soul of the Soviet system--its
dictatorial character. Many Western analysts view the outward manifesta¬
tions of the de-Stalinization campaign as a definite break with the past,
involving a revision of the basic Soviet institutions which becomes an ir¬
reversible process leading in the direction of alternate loci of power, con¬
sequently democratization, and subsequently "pacification" of the Soviet
regime. Meticulous examination of the structure of the Soviet system since
the death of Stalin proves this theory to be of dubious validity.
"The forms of the Soviet system remain unaltered, and it is the forms
that one observes from the outside or superficially inside."^ In form
the Soviet Union is a one-party dictatorship. No democratic institutions
have been introduced. No constitutional provisions would prevent the party
^Kennedy, op. cit., p. 670
^Black, op. cit., pp. 569-570.
^Louis Fischer, Russia Revisited (Garden City, 1957), p. 26.
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Presiditim or federal cabinet from decreeing another Stalinist slaughter.
Individuals enjoy no inalienable rights; rulers are subject to no legal
checks and balances,
"What the stress on 'collective leadership? and anti-Stalinism means
is fairly obvious. Above all, the leaders 'disprove' certain maxims
and classified some things Stalin did as malpractices for pragmatic reasons.
They desire maximum flexibility for their own notions of internal and
external expediency."^
In emancipating themselves from some of the more dogmatic
aspects of Stalinism, and from the more rigid mechanisms
of the old regime to gain freedom of action, the current
leaders have the logic of objective circumstances upper¬
most in mind. Their reactions to the excesses of Stali¬
nism are not those of shocked and sensitive humanitarians,
for they have not disowned the efficacy of the secret
police methods as such nor did they hesitate to use the
same techniques of repression in disposing of Beria or
in breaking up the Georgian pro-Stalinist demonstrations
that they once employed in the secret service.^
Hence some foreign interpreters of the Soviet scene have misled them¬
selves by equating de-Stalinization with democratization and moderation.
But all the reasons for de-Stalinization were political and personal. The
aim was not to liberalize or to introduce democracy. The aim was to gain
political advantage and personal security. Limited liberalization is
merely a by-product, and, too, an indication that Stalin's terror methods
are obsolete because unnecessary.
Compulsion is the chief weapon by which eighty million peasants are
kept on collective farms. Similarly, compulsion is the means by which the
government turns the industries of the Soviet Union. The working men are
^Kennedy, op. cit., p. 679.
^Ibid.
not permitted to strike; their trade unions are adjuncts of the state in
promoting speed up methods and keeping wages down; they are exposed to
all the evils of a mighty bureaucracy which does everything,^ Thus there
exists today no radical discontinuity between the structure of the
Soviet government under Stalin and that of Khrushchev, nor the methods
that both have employed to keep their supremacy intact. Indeed, terror
is still an ultimate and rational alternative to the destruction of party
primacy in every aspect of domestic concern.
"The four pillars of Stalinism were, and are: agrarian collectiviza¬
tion; state management of industry; one party monopoly political control;
and imperialism. They continue to be regarded by the Moscow directing
collective as the unalterable supports of the Soviet system (though
naturally they do not call their imperialism by that name)."^ Stalin is
dead. Yet many of his policies are still mirrored in the policy of his
successors. In this respect Khrushchev could say without contradiction
in 1957 that, "Stalin was a great Marxist, he was not solely to blame
for his errors. When it comes to fighting imperialism we are all Stalinist
There is another school of contemporary Western observers of the
Soviet scene which contends that Soviet totalitarianism must give away to
a more democratic order for it is incompatible with the requirements of a
modern highly industrialized and bureaucratized society. Noting that
totalitarianism in the past has seemed largely irrational, it argues that
^Fischer, op. cit., p. 81.
^Ibid.
O
"Khrushchev's Sharpened Dilemma"', Life, January 14, 1957, p. 37.
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the rationalistic routines of the indispensable managers of the industrial
society will necessarily transmit themselves to the totalitarian leader¬
ship and gradually effect a fundamental transformation of the system
itself. The machine, so the argument runs, disciplines the worker with
the discipline of the assembly line, forcing him to acquire the virtues
of precision, punctuality, and a close awareness of the relationship be¬
tween physical cause and effect, in a word, rationality. With the full
development of this process, the revolutionary torch and upheading quest
are displaced by the swivel chair and punch clock.
Implicit in this argument is the assumption that as stability, pre¬
dictability and overall rationality set in, fear, terror and arbitrari¬
ness will fade and the bureaucrat will increasingly share in the running
of the political machine. As a result, "'mass enthusiasm and unanimity
will give way to open discussion of real issues in the market place, etc.,
and ultimately a pluralism will set in which will allow democracy to
enter in the back door."^
One of the most seasoned exponents of this argument is Issac Deutscher.
In his Russia What Next?, Deutscher stresses the point that "the economic
progress made during the Stalin era has at last brought within the reach
of the people a measure of well-being which should make possible an orderly
2
winding up of Stalinism and gradual democratic revolution." Deutscher s
analysis by no means exhausts all the elements of the problem, for democracy
involves the view of some, a certain philosophic outlook which stresses
rule by a collective rather than a small omnipotent elite, a spirit of fair
^Z. K. Brzezinski, "Totalitarianism and Rationality," American Political
Science Review, L (September, 1956), 758.
^Deutscher, Russia What Next?. op. cit. . p. 221.
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play and responsibility by which the state functions as an agency to
protect the individual in the enjoyment of his inalienable right, a basic
recognition of some kind of higher law - none of which seems to be
remotely present in the Soviet Union.
His deterministic view also does not come to grips with democracy
in its pluralistic perspective, the economic aspect of which is merely
a part of the diversified whole; nor does it take into account the per¬
petuating character of Soviet control organs which tend to have a vested
interest in developing methods to keep their power intact. In the words
of Fainsod:
As long as the Kremlin leaders continue to see their future
in the terms of industrial and military might, they will
probably persist in relying on totalitarian instrtiments to
force the pace of industrialization. Those who possess abso¬
lute power do not part with it willingly. The governing
formula of Soviet totalitarianism rests on a moving equili¬
brium of alternating phases of repression and relaxation, but
its essential contours remain unchanged. The totalitarian
regime does not shed its police-state characteristics; it dies
when power is wrenched from its hands.^
The implication that the arbitrary use of terror is incompatible
with a bureaucratic-infested, highly technical society does not hold up
when viewed in the broad context of modern history. This point is stressed
by Brzezinski when he states;
The Nazi system was imposed with all the earmarks of revo¬
lutionary totalitarianism on a society with a highly de¬
veloped industrial order....Yet there is no indication in
all the available evidence that the fanatical, often
irrational, usually brutal, Nazi leadership was in any way
deterred from its purpose by the influence or orientations
of the German technocrats or bureaucrats.^
Fainsod, op.cit., p. 500.
2
Brzezinski, "Totalitarianism and Rationality," op. cit., p. 759.
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The bureaucratization of modern totalitarian governments does not
necessarily hinder the use of absolute political power but might actually
trigger its ultimate manifestations by posing a grave threat to the dic¬
tatorship.
The conclusion to this discussion, therefore, emerges that,
despite all the important developments in the Soviet Union since 1953,
there has been no basic change. Khrushchev, no less than Lenin and Stalin,
strives to maintain intact the principle of party supremacy, However,
it is clear that his methods are different, in some respects, from Stalin's.
Where Stalin ruled at best by dictation, at worst by naked terror,
Khrushchev rules by persuasion, intimidation and a form of rational
paternalistic discipline which through strict is at any rate rational.^
The trend of the past few years in the Soviet Union has therefore
been in the direction of benevolent despotism rather than toward a free
society. The basic principle of the party leadership, the morbid suspi¬
cion of any public or private activity which the ruling power cannot
control through its party tentacles, and the initiation of policy by
2
direction from above all remain as before. Neither increased prosperity
nor industrial(fevelopment is likely to affect this pattern, so long as
the party's stranglehold is preserved.




PRESENT STATUS OF SOVIET TERROR
Decline of Terror in the Soviet System.--Social and economic progress
in the U.S.S.R,, since the death of Stalin, has been accompanied by a
significant relaxation of overt police terror. Terror, as Harold Berman
observes, no longer means that every Soviet citizen has his suitcase packed
in anticipation of being whisked to a labor camp in the middle of the
night.^
Unlike the days of Stalin, the secret police is no longer the sole
respository of Soviet justice. "Khrushchev's exposure of Stalin and Beria
was accompanied by the administrative division of political police
functions. No public mention of the security organs was henceforth made
2
without some included reference to the observance of 'socialist legality',"
Today the political police is deprived the power to sentence, imprison,
and deport Soviet citizens; and the secret trial, guilt by association,
collective responsibility, and many other ill-famed features of Stalinist
3
"^justice" are being abolished.
The decade since Stalin's departure has also witnessed the decline
of the grim world of slave labor camps, which in the course of several
decades sucked in, absorbed, and destroyed Russia's rebellious spirits
^Harold J. Berman, The Russians In Focus (Boston, 1951), p. 192.
p
Sidney Monas, "'The Political Police: The Dream of a Beautiful Auto¬
cracy'^ in Cyril E. Black (ed.). The Transformation of Russian Society
(Cambridge, 1960), p. 184.
3
Issac Deutscher, The Great Contest (New York and London, 1960), p. 13.
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and minds, leaving the nation intellectually impoverished and morally
benumbed.^. This fact tends to suggest that the role of labor camps
as penal institutions for political oppositionist and non-conformist has
ceased to be of significant value to the Soviet system. Hence, at the
Twenty-first Party Congress the head of the state security organs, A. H.
Sholpin, could proudly announce that, "today there is no one incarcerated
2
in our prisons out of political motives,"'
Even from the most acute standpoint of self-interest, there comes a
point at which the use of terror defeats its purpose. Some awareness of
this fact may conceivably have motivated Stalin's heirs to release their
subjects from the morbid yoke of Stalinist oppression.
If everybody in a society is marked as an actual or potential
scoundrel, all sorts of vital social relations will break down.
The subordinate will not obey his superior if he is made to
feel that this obedience will soon be held against him as evi¬
dence of collaboration in some deep lying plot against the
state.^
The atmosphere of universal suspicion which terror breeds is not
ordinarily conducive to creative thinking and displays of individual ini¬
tiative.
If the weight of terror becomes too great and the penalty of
administrative failure of mistake is MVD detention, it becomes
difficult to persuade people to take responsibility. Even
those driven by fear of the secret police to work as they have
never worked before begin to crack under the strain. It is no
easy task to apply terror and at the same time to hold it in
leash.^
^Deutscher, Russia in Transition, op. cit., p. 4.
2
Monas, op. cit., p. 187.
\bid.
4
Fainsod, op. cit., p. 389.
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A system or government which relies on a large secret police as a
basic core of its power can never be secure. The instruments of the
secret police when acting at full capacity discriminates very little be¬
tween ruler and ruled--the manipulator and the manipulated. Indeed the
primary hazard of terror as a system of power is that it ends by terrori¬
zing the master as well as the slave.
Today in the U.S.S.R, the totalitarian system is operating in an en¬
vironment where the need for unbridled violence, terror in its most open
form, and unpredictability based on dictatorial whims seem no longer to
be present or desirable.^ Hence, the modern skilled Soviet dictator
employs more subtle means to elicit popular support for his policies. He
may weave a complex web of controls in which indoctrination and incentives
have their appropriate place. Agitation and propaganda may rally fanatic
support and appeals to self-interest may enlist the energies of the ambi¬
tious and bind their fortune to the regime. When discontent accumulates,
loyalty to the regime may be consolidated to provide scapegoats on whom
frustrated aggression may exhaust itself. Under the facade of benevolent
reforms and respect for law, he may reaffirm public faith in the regime's
ability to comply with human needs and aspirations. He may supplant
punitive reprisals with policies by which grievances on non-political and
non-organizational matters can be ventilated. Finally, he may regenerate
revolutionary ferver in the party by stressing a return to the sacred
doctrines and values of Lenin and the early Bolsheviks in which dedication
^Z. K. Brzezinski, "Totalitarianism and Rationality," American
Political Science Review, L (September, 1956), 762.
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and service were the principal criteria for party membership. All of
these are potent measures by which the modern Soviet dictator attempts
to yield to the demands of a rapidly evolving society while stabilizing
the supremacy of the party and instruments of control.
The decline in the use of terror as a method of party control has
prompted a famous English journalist to make the following comment:
One informant told me that he knew of large country houses
which were used by the security police...they served, he
said, as centers from which the countryside was 'terrorized.'
Today the houses are in some cases comfortable 'motels,'
where you can enjoy your stay in an atmosphere of tranquility.
One could hardly discover, I thought, a more eloquent example
of deliverance from evil.l
Continuing Role of Terror in the Soviet System.--The view that the
Soviet Union has been completely delivered from the evils of terror intro¬
duced by Lenin and perpetuated by Stalin is undoubtedly an exaggeration.
Although it would seem that the disease of terror in the U.S.S.R, has been
reduced, the germ which created the infection is still very active and
potentially capable of reasserting itself with full vigor.
The methods of de-Stalinization have not been accompanied by a ban on
the use of terror as a means of maintaining the dictatorship of the party
and solidarity of the Soviet state. Hence, in the same speech in which he
denounced Stalin's ruthless use of police brutality, Khrushchev paradoxi¬
cally states that,
in connection with the revision and cancellation of a number
of verdicts some comrades have begun to exhibit a certain lack
of confidence towards the workers in the organs of state




, "The Soviet Thaw-Tactic or Policy," Nation, August
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overwhelming majority are honest workers devoted to our cause,
and we have confidence in these cadres.... Capitalist encircle¬
ment has sent among us not a few spies and wreckers.... There¬
fore, we must in every way strengthen the revolutionary vigilance
...and the organs of state security.^
In this statement we see again Stalin's perennial justification for
maintaining a powerful terror apparatus.
At the fortieth anniversary celebration of the Cheka, Ivan Serov
(The chief of security organs) affirmed the terror in a similar manner,
when he stated; "'Now that Soviet science and technology have been shown
to be in advance of the United States, espionage against the U.S.S.R, has
2
a special significance."' Serov concluded by urging mass cooperation
with the police in denouncing violations of security.
From these statements it becomes pretty clear that, although de-
Stalinization has produced many outward changes in the Soviet environment,
it has not significantly penetrated into the roots of the system itself.
The party continues to play its crucially important role and, indeed, the
significance of the party as the mainspring of the system has increased.
No effective restraints on the arbitrary use of terror have yet developed.
As long as the system prohibits free public debate and genuine political
opposition, there is no other effective method for discovering opponents
O
than by secret police.'’ As one writer points out, "the terror is explained
by the system; the system is not explained by the terror."^ The potential
^Bertram D. Wolfe, "Stalin's Ghost at the Party Congress," Foreign
Affairs, XXXIV (July, 1956), 562.
2
Monas, op. cit., p, 187.
3




of terror is present, and the party would not hesitate to use violence
to defend its monopoly of power. Although terror under the present Soviet
regime tends to preclude broad sweeping purges reminiscent of the Stalinist
era, we cannot rule this out as an ultimate possibility.
There are still a number of services that organized terror perform
for the Soviet regime. In the first place, it helps to generate in some
people a sort of generalized fear, a sensation of guilt, that in many
cases results in feats of prodigious effort.^ In the second place, it
hits heavily at the instruments of the dictatorship, reaching down to
interfere with operations at any level, thus preventing them from obtaining
autonomous power which might someday acquire a momentum of its own.
The purge operates today as a device to clear the road for talent,
keeping open channels of upward mobility, a necessary feature in any
dynamic industrial society. In the words of Professor Barrington Moore,
"mobility might be maintained without purges, but hardly the same degree
of control over the entire social system. The purges are vital insofar
as they demonstrate that continuation in any office is not a matter of
prescriptive right but depends upon the performance of a task in accord
2
with criteria that are primarily, though not entirely, political."
Terror, subtle though it may be, still plays an important role in
the Soviet system. One should not expect this role to be dissolved until




genuine democratic elements are allowed to assert themselves and disperse
the monolithic control of the omnipotent dictatorship. Emphasis on
legal rationality and public concessions by present Soviet leaders fall
far short of fulfilling this task and it does not appear that they will
do so in the immediate future. At best they tend to indicate that heads
will roll, but they will roll legally. The new regime still requires
terror as an essential aspect of its power and it is unlikely to give it




Evolving patterns of social alienation and human reconstruction
have given rise to the modern totalitarian state. This system of govern¬
ment tends to be a product of a highly technological society where loud¬
speaker, newspaper, telephone, police wagon, tank, and plane, can
enable governmental officials to reach the far corners and most secret
places of their domain.
Unlike traditional dictatorship, the totalitarian state does not
attempt to freeze itself in the status quo, but seeks to feed the fire
of permanent revolution which increases in scope and intensity, as the
regime secures its power and control over the organs of the state. This
revolution aims at pulverizing the existing social units in the state
so that the nature of man and society can be reshaped according to certain
ideal conceptions. Totalitarian regimes thus do not satisfy themselves
with the mere acquisition of power but perennially work to extend this
power into every crevice of society.
In the total state, all primary social units and institutions must
give way to the will of the state as dictated by the governing elite.
There can be, in this context, no institution with the right to have a
purpose or validity of its own. As a result, all trade unions, political
parties, churches, clubs, etc., must either become arms of the state or
be crushed. The state is determined to own everything lock, stock, and
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barrel, including men's souls.
It is this determination to acquire a total grip on society by
destroying associations and institutionalizing perpetual change that be¬
gets the terror. The terror acts as a mechanism for stamping out oppo¬
sition to the ideals of the state and attempts to strike fear in the
hearts of those who might be harboring rebellious sentiments or aspira¬
tions. Through the ruthless methods of mass executions and deportations
modern totalitarian regimes have been able to stabilize their power while
fulfilling the objective of permanent revolution.
The Soviet Union is one of the greatest totalitarian states of our
age. In no other country have the weapons of internal war (propaganda,
isolation of the individual, indoctrination, etc.) been used in a more
effective manner.
Terror and dictatorship can trace their origin in Russia to the
rich legacy of oppression left by the Czars. During the course of their
rule over Russia, Lenin and the Bolsheviks adopted and accentuated these
brutal methods. Originally designed to smash counter-revolutionary and
bourgeoise elements operating in the state, Lenin's politics of terror
eventually encompassed the greater part of Soviet society in a massive
civil strife which enveloped many innocent citizens in its wake.
To facilitate the successful achievement of his revolutionary ob¬
jectives, Lenin bequeathed to Soviet Russia two crucial organs, the
security police and the party. Under Lenin the security (secret) police
functioned as an instrument of Bolshevik domination by ruthlessly stamping
out bourgeoise and counter-revolutionary oppositionists who endeavored
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to prevent the ascendancy of the Bolshevik party as the ultimate source
of power in the revolutionary government. This agency has since been
preserved as the backbone of party control, capable of suppressing with
brute force any opposing faction or coalition arising in the state.
Through the methods of terror, Lenin successfully established his
dream of a one-party ruling elite in the Soviet state. This organization
developed as the predominant institution of the Soviet dictatorship. All
other institutions were of paper form in the sense that they were party--
controlled, and not freely-elected bodies which they purported to be--
Soviets, trade union councils, and the like. This made it possible for
the party to preserve the semblance of popular democratic activity, without
endangering executive control over all aspects of life. The preservation
of this dominant function of the party has traditionally been the most
cherished ideal of the governing elite.
Joseph Stalin ascended to the helm of the Soviet state by manipulating
party apparatus, suppressing all opposition to his authority within party
ranks, and clothing himself in the mantle of Lenin (thereby presenting
the appearance of being his incarnated descendant).
Under Stalin, the terror achieved its crowning height. From 1936-39,
he launched a mass purge of the party which tore its inner fibers to
shambles. Countless citizens who were suspected of being in some way
connected with a grand alliance to overthrow the Soviet government were
either physically liquidated or sent to far-off forced labor camps. Fear
and hysteria underminded all forms of Soviet life, touching in every nook
and cranny of the empire. Only when the violence threatened to completely
disrupt the foundations of the whole country was the mounting pressure of
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terror lifted.
In the years following this orgy of blood-letting the Soviet Union
suffered grave tribulations of human sacrifice and compliance to the
bizarre myths and rituals prescribed by an absolute dictator. During this
period, fealty to Stalin became the standardized norm by which Soviet
citizens were expected to demonstrate their true patriotic spirit.
Years since the death of Stalin have produced many developments in
the Soviet Union behind which one can visualize a significant change in
climate. One of the most important aspects of this period has been the
attempt to destroy the legacy of Stalinist oppression. Within weeks after
his death, many of Stalin's most sacred policies were denounced. Further
progression from Stalinism witnessed the demotion of many of his trusted
servants and the rehabilitation of many party members who had been banished
into obscurity and disgrace.
These events culminated in Khrushchev's secret speech at the Twentieth
Party Congress in which he exposed many of Stalin's most horrid crimes to
his party and ultimately to the world. All of the tensions built up in
the Soviet system from forced collectivism, rapid industrialization, and
mass deportation were heaped on the shoulders of the individual who had
proclaimed for himself the title "Father of the People" and ruled Russia
with an iron hand for nearly three decades.
The denunciation of Stalin's cult has been accompanied by broad
sweeping social reforms and relaxation of fear and tension. Institutionalized
checks have been placed on the secret police to guarantee that it will no
longer function as the overbearing sword of state oppression. Abandonment
of Soviet slave labor camps has taken place at a rapidly increasing rate.
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The new regime now stresses rule by law and increased emphasis on consumer
goods, rather than arbitrary justice and shoddy public merchandise.
The moral and intellectual spirit of modern Russia has been regenerated.
Men of letters, artists, and scientists have all appealed against the
ubiquitous orthodoxy which exercised an obtuse censorship over ideas and
images. They have attempted to initiate a drive to revive the arts from
the decadence of the Stalinist era. The results have been stupendous.
Soviet scientists have outstripped the United States in many aspects of
the race to the moon and many Soviet artists have begun to assert them¬
selves in the finest traditions of modern culture.
According to Issac Deutscher, this revival of intellectual ferver
has uplifted the spirit of many Russian patriots who suffered at the hands
of Stalin. Hence, novels like Ehrenburg's Thaw and Dudintsev's Not by
Bread Alone have had a tremendous impact on the moral consciousness of a
country where the very titles ring like the Bells of Saint Mary. It is
possible that many people identified themselves with Ehrenburg's and
Dudintsev's heroes because they reflected miseries to which they had once
been exposed. More recently a bestselling story in both East and West
describes life in a Siberian labor camp, this work probably also has great
significance for those who were once forced to live through similar
experiences.
The ultimate result of this pattern of regeneration has been the re¬
awakening of public aspiration for the good life. The government has
begun to yield to these demands by allowing a limited amount of criticism
to be ventilated on non-political and non-organizational matters. In
87
Stalin's day, a newspaper attack on a badly managed factory for lack of
nylon stockings would have been unthinkable. Now such criticism is
tolerated, and even welcomed when it is held within reasonable bounds.
These stupendous social, cultural and economic changes in the Soviet
system have produced widespread foreign speculation that Russia has
completely disentangled herself from the Stalinist past and set into
motion irreversible developments that will ultimately evolve the Soviet
system into a democratic order. Although outward appearances tend to
give this speculation an aura of great validity, the reality of facts
fail to conform to this deterministic outlook.
The Soviet Union is still run on the pattern of one-party dictator¬
ship developed and solidified by Lenin and accentuated by Stalin. A
shift in this pivotal foundation of Soviet totalitarianism is highly un¬
likely. The notion of democratic principles such as the free interplay
of interest within the state goes completely contrary to the idea of
manipulating people and social forces to bring about a predetermined
political objective, one of the guiding principles of Soviet dictatorial
rule. Since 1953, the party apparatus has extended and consolidated its
hold over the country to a greater extent than ever before.
Liberal reforms are by no means meant to be permanent but are
methods of party expediency. After they have served their designed
purpose they are often swiftly repealed. Hence, recently Soviet propaganda
departments have sought to re-establish their control over literature
and art. Even as early as 1957 Khrushchev issued a sharp warning to the
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intellectuals that they had indulged in an incorrect understanding of the
essence of party criticism of Stalin's personality cult and tactifully
suggested that they return to the sane and sober policies of "social
realism".
The concept of terror is still an operational feature of the Soviet
system. No fundamental denial of this ultimate weapon to coerce conformity
has manifest itself in the policies of the present ruling regime. As the
ruthless attack of the Red Army on Hungary and subtle purges in 1957 and
1959 aptly illustrate, one should not expect the present leadership to
become so relaxed from long lack of exercise that it will become unwilling
or unable to use this powerful weapon with maximum efficiency. Although
the secret police has been stripped of much of its dynamic energy, it
still remains in reserve as a useful weapon fully capable of demonstrating
its terror potentialities.
The Soviet Union has evolved into a period of acquiescence where the
passion for terror is no longer the motivating force behind governmental
policy. However, as long as the road to absolute power is not blocked
with adequate democratic restraints, the Soviet state will not likely
shed its totalitarian character. Thus, for the foreseeable future we
should expect the party to maintain its monolithic control over the whole
of Soviet society and all decision-making power to remain in predominantly
political hands.
This does not completely rule out the possible dissolution of the
Soviet dictatorship in the distant future. We know too little of the
dynamics of totalitarian systems to be certain that the unlimited authority
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which the Soviet leadership presently exercises may not be subject to
ultimate erosion or displacement by forces which are not now visible on
the horizon. History has a way of confounding those who claim to have
developed an infallible insight into its future.
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